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DEMAND RESPONSE’S THREE GENERATIONS: MARKET
PATHWAYS AND CHALLENGES IN THE MODERN ELECTRIC GRID
Joel B. Eisen*
Through a historical analysis spanning nearly five decades,
this Article provides a comprehensive discussion of how demand
response (reductions in electricity consumption in response to grid
emergencies or price signals) has become both a growing resource
on the electric grid and a policy trailblazer in the grid’s ongoing
transformation. The discussion centers on three separate
generations of efforts to promote demand-side measures in the
electric grid, dating to the 1960s and oriented chronologically
around important events in the electric power industry.
Demand response has been a test bed of important regulatory
principles like frameworks for interactivity with the grid, the role
of third parties and new business models, and the split of
regulatory jurisdiction between states and FERC. For this reason,
the Article introduces and discusses the concept of “market
pathways”—experiences learned from combinations of technology
advances, regulatory innovations, and judicial and regulatory
proceedings that tested demand response’s legitimacy and
implementation. These pathways, the Article claims, now form a
significant part of the foundation for overhauling the electric grid
to accommodate all distributed energy resources, not simply
demand response. Thus, the Article concludes, demand response is
important for the long-term, iterative regulatory strategies that
promoted it, viewed against the context of the electric power
industry’s ever changing overall regulatory and policy landscape.
The Article concludes with an examination of “demand
response 3.0.” This is the current industry landscape in which the
green light for innovation and experimentation, combined with
further advances in technology and the rise of sophisticated
distributed energy resources (including energy storage, distributed
solar PV, and others), have prompted policymakers to steer the
electric grid towards a modernized, two-way, participatory system.
351
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This Article concludes that the lessons learned from decades of
demand-side participation in the grid will be useful in blazing a
policy path toward a participatory grid, and applies these
strategies and principles to guide future policymaking.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article’s aim is two-fold. First, it explains something that
once would have seemed wholly improbable about demand
response—the electric power industry’s term for reductions in
electricity consumption in response to grid emergencies or price
signals.1 Demand response is something that the industry has more
or less shunned since its inception, economists often find
suboptimal, and consumers do not yet seem to truly understand or
want. Yet, despite all that, it is now both a growing resource on the
electric grid and a policy trailblazer in the grid’s ongoing
transformation. Second, it describes how the principles and lessons
learned in the nearly fifty-year history of demand-side measures in
the electric grid, including the fifteen years since demand response
began to participate as a resource in the nation’s organized
wholesale markets, inform the ongoing transformation of this staid
industry.
The electric power sector is undergoing an upheaval
unparalleled in its history.2 A wide range of technologies and
* Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Fellow, University of Richmond
School of Law. The author thanks the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology for its kind invitation to publish this Article in conjunction with its
symposium on “The Impact of Demand Response Technology on the Electricity
Sector.”
1
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016).
2
James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and
Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71,
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business models are bringing rapid change to an industry not
generally known to have an appetite for it.3 Distributed energy
resources are playing a larger role in meeting demand and
stabilizing the grid.4 Consider this (hardly exhaustive) list: “A
variety of emerging distributed technologies—including flexible
demand, distributed generation, energy storage, and advanced
power electronics and control devices—are creating new options
for the provision and consumption of electricity services.”5 This
has prompted states and the federal government to consider grid
modernization, which promises a radically different electric grid
than that of past decades and extensive changes to the monopoly
business models of utilities that have dominated the grid for over a
century. Some efforts have involved installation of physical
devices to overhaul the grid, and some have come in the policy
arena where regulators and other policymakers seek to make the
electric grid cleaner, more efficient, and more reliable.
At this inflection point in the grid’s arc, demand response has
been a focal point for deciding momentous policy questions,
including those addressed in the 2016 Supreme Court decision
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply
Association (“FERC v. EPSA”).6 That decision upheld the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) rule, Order 745,7 which
73 (2014) (“The electricity industry has changed in fundamental ways . . . never
contemplated by the drafters of the FPA.”).
3
For discussions of industry transformation, see MIT ENERGY INIT., UTILITY
OF
THE
FUTURE
viii
(2016),
https://energy.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/Utility-of-the-Future-Full-Report.pdf; EDISON ELEC.
INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS (2013),
www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf.
4
See generally Distributed Energy Resources, ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST.,
http://www2.epri.com/Our-Work/Pages/Distributed-Electricity-Resources.aspx
(last visited May 12, 2016).
5
MIT ENERGY INIT., supra note 3, at viii.
6
136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016).
7
Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets,
76 Fed. Reg. 16,657, 16,659 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
[hereinafter Order 745]. For contemporaneous analysis of demand response and
Order 745, see Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority
over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN
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required that demand response be compensated at the full energy
market price.
This Article argues that demand response has taken center
stage in the grid modernization debate precisely because it was
overlooked for decades. Persistently knocking at the industry’s
door, it struggled for years to gain full acceptance and participation
in electricity markets. Finally, after fifteen years of remarkable
progress, it is significantly closer to that goal. Thus, demand
response is important for the long-term, iterative regulatory
strategies that promoted it, viewed against the context of the
electric power industry’s ever changing overall regulatory and
policy landscape.
As a result of this decades-long evolution, demand response
continues to grow into an even more valuable grid resource, and
the lessons learned along the way are useful in blazing a policy
path toward a two-way, participatory electric grid.8 These “market
pathways”—experiences learned from combinations of technology
advances, regulatory innovations, and judicial and regulatory
proceedings that tested demand response’s legitimacy and
implementation—now form a significant part of the foundation for
overhauling the grid to accommodate distributed energy resources.
With demand response, we have been working out the bugs for
fifteen years, although much more work is still required.
Demand response alone did not (and will not) change the
electric grid. But how demand response transformed from an
afterthought to a valuable grid resource, particularly through
FERC’s efforts, matters greatly. It has established important
principles that others can and will use in promoting energy storage,
electric vehicles, and distributed solar as they are improving and
impacting the grid in ever increasing amounts. Significant
questions have been asked repeatedly and addressed through policy
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Who Regulates
the Smart Grid?]; Richard J. Pierce Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a
Critique of FERC Order 745, 102 GEO. WASH. U. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102
(2011).
8
Shelley Welton, Clean Energy Justice, COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(discussing attributes of a “participatory grid”).
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development and tests of those policies. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has upheld important elements of the path. FERC v. EPSA,
and, by extension, the Court’s support for other FERC demand
response policies, validates electric grid transformation and
experimentation, not simply the single agency rule at issue in the
case.
Part I begins with two threshold matters: addressing the
confusion about what demand response is, and discussing demand
response’s benefits for a modern grid. Then, Part II transitions to
the 1970s, when the providers of demand-side resources began a
long battle to be treated comparably with generation in the electric
grid. As such, FERC v. EPSA’s ratification of comparability was
no mean feat. As Part II discusses and Part III elaborates further,
its proponents have constantly had to defend the proposition that
demand reductions (“negawatts”) were things, and that they should
be treated the same as “megawatts.” Part III then discusses FERC’s
efforts to put demand response on a level playing field with
generation in organized wholesale markets. An important
component of this policy development is FERC’s recognition and
support of participation by third-party entrepreneurs competing
with utilities with different business model characteristics and the
Supreme Court finally sanctioning this experimentation. FERC’s
efforts have resulted in tremendous progress, although there is still
suboptimal demand response participation.
As this Article’s title suggests, to organize the disparate
elements of this story, it is useful to speak of three generations of
demand-side measures with specific combinations of technologies
and policies encouraging demand-side participation. This Article
terms these demand response 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0, respectively, and
orients them chronologically around important events in the
electric power industry that influenced demand-side participation.
These events include the enactment of the federal energy statutes
of the 1970s, the utility industry restructuring of the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and the growth of wholesale electricity markets in the
2000s. Part II discusses the first generation of demand-side
measures after the enactment of federal energy statutes encouraged
it. It shows that demand response techniques are not a creature of
the Internet age, although “demand response 1.0” is a bit of a
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misnomer because that term did not come into vogue until the
2000s. Still, Part II uses the term to illustrate continuity in policy
themes, as the early years show the persistence of debates that have
recurred for decades. Part II concludes with a discussion of
retrenchment from mandated demand-side management programs,
and lower spending, in the industry’s restructuring of the 1990s.
Part III begins when industry participants and observers first
conceived of “demand response”: the California electricity crisis of
2000-2001 and its aftermath. Demand response’s second
generation features the emergence and growth of competitive
wholesale markets, sparked by transformational FERC Orders. Part
III traces how demand response programs evolved in the wholesale
markets for the next fifteen years, discusses barriers that inhibited
participation, and analyzes FERC Orders developed to address
those barriers. Part III concludes with FERC v. EPSA’s holding
that demand response can at times have as much value as power
and can trade at market rates. Finally, after nearly fifty years, the
notion of a level playing field for demand side resources has been
ratified, if not always achieved yet in practice. FERC v. EPSA
would be important for this reason alone, even if it had not also
confirmed a tectonic shift in our understanding of electricity
federalism whose ramifications may last for decades.9
Part IV then turns to “demand response 3.0,” the current
landscape in which the green light for innovation and
experimentation, combined with further advances in technology
and the rise of sophisticated distributed energy resources
(including energy storage, distributed solar PV, and others) have
prompted more market opportunities. There may eventually be
distribution-level markets, as contemplated in proceedings such as

9

Articles discussing this significant development include: Joel B. Eisen, Dual
Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO.
WASH. J. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 3 (2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual Electricity
Federalism Is Dead]; Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner
Electricity Sector, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen,
FERC v. EPSA]; Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 399 (2016).
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New York’s landmark Reforming the Energy Vision effort.10 Part
IV continues with a discussion of lessons learned and observations
about how they may translate to this rapidly evolving landscape.
The Court has now settled the issue of demand response’s
importance as a grid resource. However, there is still a suboptimal
amount of it in electricity markets. There is no organic demand for
using less electricity. Progress to more demand-side participation
in the grid takes place against a backdrop of hostility, so programs
can be derailed by those adversely affected by incentives for
demand response. Opposition from entrenched players, particularly
incumbent utilities and generators of electricity and their allies, can
slow progress. In fact, opponents have made arguments against it
for decades, such as the jurisdictional claim that FERC v. EPSA
finally resolved. The relationship between the states and the federal
government is complicated by the presence of demand response
programs at both levels, requiring difficult discussions and
complex coordination.
Thus, improving technologies alone is insufficient, and policy
support has been indispensable to demand response’s success, as is
the case for other distributed energy resources. Working out the
rules for participation has required considerable tinkering and
iteration, and the path of progress has hardly been straight.
Progress has always depended upon the presence of visionary state
and federal regulators who see the need for innovation. When
policy support has lagged, especially at major inflection points in
the industry’s evolution, so too has demand-side participation.
Even as new market opportunities develop, but are just emerging
and beginning to be defined, this suggests progress may take much
longer and be less linear than one might gather from the current
enthusiasm. On the other hand, considering that demand response
emerged from the shadows to become a major factor in the grid’s
evolution, it would seem that almost anything is possible.

10

Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SVC.,
http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA0
07DCFE2?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
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I.

DEMAND RESPONSE AND THE ELECTRIC GRID,
EXPLAINED
To begin this decades-long story, we must first address a
threshold matter: what is demand response? Without an
understanding of the electric grid and its complexities, this term
has no meaning. Paying a customer to not buy a product has no
analogue outside of the electric power industry, not to markets for
pears, clothing, or furniture.11 Companies that do this would
eventually go out of business, and demand response has always
been viewed as something that “seems to run counter to the normal
operation of markets.”12 And there is another problem. It has
understandably been tough to tell what demand response is. One
article observes that it “can mean many different things to many
different people.”13 The two words are exceedingly opaque, and it
does not help that “demand response” encompasses about a dozen
different strategies to reduce consumption, none of which is easily
suggested by the name.14 This Part begins by clarifying this
confusion, and then segues into a discussion of demand response’s
benefits to the modern grid.
A. So . . . What Exactly Is Demand Response?
At its core, demand response involves a utility (or someone
else) paying a customer to buy less of something (electricity) that
customer needs, day in and day out. One early form of demand
response was “interruptible” rates, or lower prices offered in return
11

James Bushnell et al., When It Comes to Demand Response, Is FERC Its
Own Worst Enemy?, 22 THE ELECTRICITY J. 9, 11 (2009) (“[T]he notion that
consumers must pay and make decisions based on a real-time price is a fact of
life in all industries without explicit price regulation.”).
12
Cliff Rochlin, The Alchemy of Demand Response: Turning Demand into
Supply, 22 THE ELECTRICITY J. 10, 11 (2009).
13
Stuart Schare & Brett Feldman, A New Era of Demand Response, POWER
ENGINEERING
(Aug.
21,
2015),
http://www.powereng.com/articles/print/volume-119/issue-8/features/a-new-era-of-demandresponse.html.
14
Michael Panfil, How the Electricity World has Changed: Demand Response
and the Story of this Clean Energy Resource (Apr. 24, 2015),
https://medium.com/@EDFEnergyEX/how-the-electricity-world-has-changedcdb4e56b9b24#.q4p89oqwy.
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for the utility’s right to “call” (demand usage reductions) at
specific times. Decades ago, utilities would pick up the phone and
call on altruistic commercial and industrial customers “to cut load
in an ad hoc fashion, working their phones to find good corporate
citizens willing to turn off non-essential lighting, motors or other
equipment.”15 Here is the origin of “call” to refer to an occasion of
demand reduction. Interruptible rates enshrined this custom as
utility policy, giving these customers power up to a baseline at the
standard rate, and power above that at a reduced rate.16
Another early form was “direct load control” programs, in
which utilities used simple one-way radio communications
employed during system emergencies or times of high electricity
prices.17 The utility sent a signal, and receivers affixed to the
participating appliances either “shed” demand (turned off the
machines) or ran the appliances on shorter cycles. A typical
program could involve the use of a switch to shut off participating
residential consumers’ air conditioning units for part of some hours
during peak periods in return for a monthly flat fee.18 The customer
could not control this simple on-off process; switching happened
automatically (hence the “direct” moniker19), and utilities had full
control. In return, customers typically received financial
15

Douglas W. Caves et al., The Cost of Electric Power Interruptions in the
Industrial Sector: Estimates Derived from Interruptible Service Programs, 68
LAND ECON. 49, 52 (1992).
16
Id.
17
PETER CAPPERS ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., MARKET AND
POLICY BARRIERS FOR DEMAND RESPONSE PROVIDING ANCILLARY SERVICES IN
U.S. MARKETS 23 (2013).
18
Jon Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of
Demand Response: The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation,
28 ENERGY L.J. 389, 394 (2007). The compensation was not tied to the demand
reduction’s value. Former FERC Chairman, Jon Wellinghoff, noted that, “As
these programs were structured, consumers did not see real time wholesale price
signals, nor were consumers compensated for the full value they contributed to
the system by shedding load.” Id.
19
G. Heber Weller, New Wave of Direct Load Control: Update on DLC
Systems, Technology, ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER (July 1, 2011),
http://www.elp.com/articles/powergrid_international/print/volume-16/issue7/features/new-wave-of-direct-load-control-update-on-dlc-systemstechnology.html.
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incentives. Programs usually had design features that restricted
how often the utility could call events, how long each event could
last, and so forth.20 This form of obtaining demand reductions from
specific devices such as air conditioners, water heaters, and pool
pumps is still widely used.21
Now, for some more contemporary forms of demand response.
FERC recently brought attention to what it called a shining new
example of the electric grid’s transformation.22 In it, the utility
Southern California Edison is teaming up with innovator darling
Nest, and is going to pay the consumer to “use less energy when
everyone else is using more.”23 The “Rush Hour Rewards”
program uses the Nest thermostat, and now that little “smart” orb
on the wall is also a cash cow. In industry-speak, Rush Hour
Rewards is a “peak time reward” program. At the most critical
times when the utility needs it, customers get a rebate on their bill
for reducing consumption.24 Rush Hour Rewards is a form of
“dynamic pricing,” the collective term for the acronym soup of
programs that change flat rate pricing for consumers.25
In other industries, we would call this “pricing,” since the
“dynamic” response would follow from the consumer’s sensitivity
20

CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 23.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM xix (2006).
22
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND
ADVANCED METERING 34 (2016) [hereinafter FERC DR-AM 2016].
23
Rush Hour Rewards, NEST, https://nest.com/energy-partners/southerncalifornia-edison/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
24
Jeff St. John, Inside Nest’s 50,000-Home Virtual Power Plant for Southern
California
Edison,
GREENTECH
MEDIA
(Sept.
14,
2016),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/inside-nests-50000-home-virtualpower-plant-for-southern-california-edison. Customers also receive a one-time
payment at enrollment.
25
FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 19. Dynamic pricing techniques
include real-time pricing, critical peak pricing, variable peak pricing, and timeof-use rates (although the last of these is sometimes not included because it is
administratively set ahead of time). Time-of-use rates typically split electricity
prices into peak prices and off-peak prices. Critical peak pricing is similar but
adds a critical peak component invoked during system emergencies or periods of
high wholesale prices. Real-time pricing is, as the name implies, a variable rate,
generally on an hourly basis.
21
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to prices. This is such an intuitive feature of competitive markets
that many economists would prefer the use of dynamic pricing in
place of any other form of demand response. Pass through
wholesale costs, have consumers pay the true price of electricity,
and they will do all the demand responding anyone would ever
need.26 But electricity markets are unique, because wholesale costs
cannot be passed directly to consumers, the vast majority of whom
still have fixed electric rates set by public utility commissions
(“PUCs”). Dynamic pricing is a chimera, painfully slow to be
adopted over the past several decades and still far from ubiquitous
for a wide variety of reasons, including a lack of political
acceptability.27
Part III discusses the type of demand response at issue in
FERC v. EPSA: bidding of demand reductions in organized
wholesale markets administered by “independent system
operators” (“ISOs”) and “regional transmission organizations”

26

Bushnell et al., supra note 11, at 10–11 (calling this a “simple but elusive
step”).
27
Numerous studies have evaluated the barriers to more widespread uptake of
dynamic pricing. For a snapshot see ANNIKA TODD, PETER CAPPERS & CHARLES
GOLDMAN, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER
ENROLLMENT IN TIME-BASED RATE AND ENABLING TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
(2013), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-6247e.pdf; PETER CAPPERS,
ANNIKA TODD & CHARLES GOLDMAN, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
SUMMARY
OF
UTILITY
STUDIES
(2013),
https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lbnl-6248e.pdf; Paul L. Joskow &
Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 381
(2012),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/wolfram/Papers/AEA%20DYNAMIC%20PRIC
ING.pdf; Ahmad Faruqui & Sanem Sergici, Household Response To Dynamic
Pricing of Electricity-A Survey of the Experimental Evidence (2009),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2009/The%20Power%20of%20Exper
imentation%20_01-11-09_.pdf; NICOLE HOPPER, CHARLES GOLDMAN & BERNIE
NEENAN, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., DEMAND RESPONSE FROM DAYAHEAD
HOURLY
PRICING
FOR
LARGE
CUSTOMERS
(2006),
https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/report-lbnl-59630.pdf; CHUCK GOLDMAN ET
AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., DOES REAL-TIME PRICING DELIVER
DEMAND RESPONSE? A CASE STUDY OF NIAGARA MOHAWK’S LARGE
CUSTOMER RTP TARIFF (2004), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/reportlbnl-54974.pdf.
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(“RTOs”),28 the operators of our regional grids. These bids often
come through market intermediaries called “aggregators” or
“curtailment service providers” (“CSPs”) that act as intermediaries,
gathering demand reductions from individual sources into larger
blocks and then offering them into the wholesale markets.29 They
contract with retail customers who wish to participate in the
markets, often because the customers could not do so directly, due
to minimum size restrictions and other limitations discussed below.
CSPs bid demand reductions from individual commercial,
industrial, and residential customers into the markets, sometimes
aggregating smaller demand reductions into one block. A
rudimentary example of how this works in practice is the “movie
theater” program described in an early report.30 The CSP
ConsumerPowerline aggregated all of the tenants within an
apartment complex in its demand response program. As the report
noted, “[i]f they are notified, the tenants are given free passes to
the local movie theater as long as they agree to turn off all nonessential equipment in their apartments when they leave. The
movie theater stamps the tickets as further verification that
customers participated.”31
What do these techniques have in common? Whether a
residential consumer takes part in Rush Hour Rewards or contracts
with a CSP for demand reductions bid into a market, the end result
is the same: reduce consumption and get paid for it.32 FERC
28

Seven regional grid operators operate markets and “serve over one-half of
the nation and provide two-thirds of the nation’s electricity.” Joel B. Eisen,
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1783, 1793 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to
Transform the Electric Grid]. The wholesale markets are described in depth in
Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the
Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016). For purposes of this Article, there is
no practical difference between ISOs and RTOs, and the term “RTOs” will be
used to refer to grid operators generally. Grid operator names including “ISO,”
such as “New York ISO,” will also be used.
29
See Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 7, at 74.
30
See DAVID KATHAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS,
POLICY AND TECHNICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ISO DEMAND RESPONSE
PROGRAMS 48 (2002).
31
Id.
32
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 17.
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defines demand response as: “Changes in electric usage by
demand-side resources from their normal consumption patterns in
response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to
incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at
times of high wholesale market prices or when system reliability is
jeopardized.”33 You, the consumer, are “responding”: changing
your electricity consumption. There is considerable debate, by the
way, about whether you are temporarily doing so, that is, simply
“time shifting” your usage to a different time of day, or actually
conserving electricity.34
There are considerable differences among demand response
programs. What you are responding to can take one of two
different forms. In “emergency” programs, the grid needs you to
reduce demand because it is too stressed: an emergency (supply
constraint or high prices) requires immediate cutbacks.35 In
“economic” programs, you participate voluntarily to receive
payments in the markets. How you respond can differ, too: your
reduction can be mandatory or voluntary. In a direct load control
program, the consumer has agreed in advance to reduce demand if
the utility determines that a specific triggering event occurs. In an
aggregator’s economic demand response program, the consumer
may set a program on a device such as the Nest (these days, often
with an app of some sort) with settings that accept a request for
demand reductions sometimes and reject them at others (if, for
33

Reports on Demand Response & Advanced Metering, FED. ENERGY
REGULATORY
COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/demand-response/dem-res-adv-metering.asp (last updated Feb. 6, 2017).
34
This concern has been recognized since the advent of demand-side
techniques. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., DEMAND RESPONSE: AN INTRODUCTION 1
(2006),
http://www.swenergy.org/data/sites/1/media/documents/publications/documents/
Demand_Response_White_Paper.pdf (“For example, a large customer may
switch from grid-supplied electricity to backup generators, when called to do so
by the utility.”); Steven Nadel & Howard Geller, Utility DSM: What have we
learned? Where are we going?, 24 ENERGY POL’Y 289, 294 (1996) (“Load
management programmes shift electric loads from one period to another
(typically from peak to off-peak periods) but generally do not reduce electricity
use.”).
35
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 9.
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example, the temperature rises above a set point). The incentive for
reducing demand can be a flat payment, a reduced electricity rate,
or something else, perhaps an agreement with an aggregator to be
paid whenever you reduce demand. Demand response programs
differ on other variables, too. As discussed below, programs vary
based on who controls the demand reduction (a utility, aggregator,
or grid operator), which types of customers are involved
(residential or commercial and industrial customers36), and how
quick the response is expected.37
Most discussions group this bewildering variety of techniques
into a few broad categories for simplicity’s sake.38 It is common to
separate dynamic pricing and incentive-based programs.39 Of
course, dynamic pricing builds in an “incentive” for reductions—if
you use less, you pay less—but the industry convention is to use
“incentive-based” to refer to other programs.40 This Article uses a
36

This distinction matters because commercial and industrial customers have
typically been more likely to have access to relevant technologies and, therefore,
have historically accounted for the lion’s share of demand response to date. U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 17 (“The decision-making process may be
somewhat different for residential and small commercial customers, who may
have a less formalized notion of their usage needs and budget than for large
commercial or industrial facilities that may include energy costs as part of a
specific operating budget.”).
37
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 15 (“Demand response options can
be deployed at all timescales of electricity system management . . . and can be
coordinated with the pricing and commitment mechanisms appropriate for the
timescale of their commitment or dispatch.”).
38
See id. at xii. For a slightly different taxonomy, see STEVEN D. BRAITHWAIT
& KELLY EAKIN, EDISON ELEC. INST., THE ROLE OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN
ELECTRIC POWER MARKET DESIGN 2 (2002) (“The report groups demand
response mechanisms into three generic categories–dynamic pricing,
interruptible and voluntary load reductions, and customer provision of ancillary
services. We focus primarily on markets for energy, rather than ancillary
services, and draw distinctions among three types of the second category of load
reduction programs: traditional load management programs, utility energy buyback programs, and ISO/RTO sponsored demand bidding programs.”).
39
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at xii; FERC DR-AM 2016,
supra note 22, at 19 n.85 (“Incentive-based demand response programs include
direct load control, interruptible, demand bidding/buyback, emergency demand
response, capacity market, and ancillary service market programs.”).
40
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at xii.
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simplified terminology to further subdivide incentive-based
programs between those conducted by utilities and by the
wholesale markets, to recognize an important distinction between
the two—the former are administered by the states and the latter by
RTOs41—and to spotlight two distinctly different market
opportunities for demand response: the wholesale markets and
potential new markets to be administered by utilities at the state
level.
I use “utility demand management” to refer to utility-based
programs. In the 1970s, “load management” encompassed
techniques available to a utility to reduce demand, that is,
interruptible rates and DLC.42 Today, utilities administer these and
other more sophisticated programs. Somewhat confusingly, some
today refer to all demand response as load management because
that is what it does: manage “load” (the industry word for
demand).43 I use “demand management” to refer to all utility
demand response programs, including those that might be more
interactive than traditional load management, and I distinguish
these from “wholesale market programs.”
From the beginning, demand response has included all three
categories—dynamic pricing, utility demand management, and
wholesale market programs—even though they differ considerably
from one another in design and function. Energy efficiency
measures, while also aimed at reducing electricity consumption,
are not included. This recognizes that some demand-side measures
can give grid operators flexibility to achieve balance between
supply and demand, but others cannot. Energy efficiency does not
produce the sort of immediate demand reductions a market needs.44
41

See, e.g., Order 745, supra note 7, at 16,660 (“While a number of states and
utilities are pursuing retail-level price-responsive demand initiatives based on
dynamic and time-differentiated retail prices and utility investments in demand
response enabling technologies, these are state efforts, and, thus, are not the
subject of this proceeding.”).
42
See, e.g., Nadel & Geller, supra note 34, at 294.
43
See ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., supra note 34, at 1.
44
See CHARLES GOLDMAN ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
COORDINATION OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY
AND DEMAND RESPONSE ES-1 (2010), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/reportlbnl-3044e.pdf.
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There is a potentially complementary relationship between the two,
although they are provided and measured differently so
coordination is necessary to achieve maximum co-benefits.45 If you
add insulation to your house to improve its efficiency, for example,
your home’s improved performance might make you more willing
to respond to a call to cut consumption immediately.46 But merely
installing the insulation would not affect supply and demand in a
wholesale market right now.
B. Demand Response’s Benefits For The Electric Grid
Demand response is a helping hand when the grid needs it.
Think of it as the grid’s WD-40: put some here, a little there, and
things work better. In its WD-40 role, demand response is valuable
in many different ways to the grid.47 You might shift electricity use
to non-peak hours, eliminating the need for power plants to start
during the small number of hours that demand peaks each year.
When you choose to respond to higher prices and reduce demand,
this may result in reduced marginal costs of electricity because
higher-cost plants would not be “dispatched” (sent by the system
operator to meet demand). Demand response programs may also
lead to reductions in usage if peak consumption is eliminated
rather than shifted, so it matters how you respond; if commercial
and industrial customers start polluting “behind the meter”
generators, this negates the benefits.48
Looking prospectively, demand response programs can help
meet future anticipated demand and avoid the unnecessary expense
of building new power plants. Demand “peakedness” requires grid
operators to have power plants on hand to meet peak demand,
which leads to oversupply of generating capacity that demand
response can help ameliorate. RTOs increasingly rely on regional
45

See generally Steven Nadel, Demand Response Programs Can Reduce
Utilities’ Peak Demand an Average of 10%, Complementing Savings from
Energy Efficiency Programs, ACEEE BLOG (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:58 PM),
http://aceee.org/blog/2017/02/demand-response-programs-can-reduce.
46
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 8.
47
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21 (discussing demand
response’s many benefits).
48
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 40.
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planning processes and capacity mechanisms49 to decide whether
new power plants are needed. Factoring demand response into
these models can lead to construction of fewer new plants.
Demand response can also help to provide ancillary services.
These are special services that keep the grid in balance, such as
reserves to provide power on short notice, where demand response
can substitute for power plants that run offline. And demand
response bids into wholesale markets compete with those of
generators and can help mitigate their market power.50
Finally, demand response is an important element of the
transition to a clean energy economy. It increases grid reliability
when used as a balancing resource for wind and solar power.51 As
more distributed energy resources are integrated to the grid,
demand response will be more useful in stabilizing it. The
“distinctive characteristics” of distributed energy resources
“highlight the importance of facilitating programs and technologies
like demand response and energy storage to help manage steep
generation ramping needs to meet net electricity load.”52
So it is good to have more of this WD-40 around. That is great,
but far from the final word. Demand response is hardly anyone’s
idea of the most exciting resource in a transformed electric grid. It
is not “clean energy” (being not energy at all), or a splashy new
thing that people want, like an electric vehicle that goes 300 miles
on one charge or a Tesla Powerwall that can store all your
homemade power. As I have said before, no one is stampeding an
Apple store at midnight to buy smart thermostats.53 It is just eating
49

An example of a capacity market is PJM’s “Reliability Pricing Model.” See
infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
50
DOUG HURLEY ET AL., REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, DEMAND
RESPONSE AS A POWER SYSTEM RESOURCE: PROGRAM DESIGNS, PERFORMANCE,
AND LESSONS LEARNED IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2013).
51
Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, Virtual Power Plants, and the
Smart Grid, 7 U. HOUS. ENVTL. & ENERGY L. AND POL’Y J. 191, 201–05 (2012)
[hereinafter Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources].
52
FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 23; Schare & Feldman, supra note
13.
53
Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation and
Federalism for the Smart Grid]. Sales of all smart thermostats are growing, but
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your spinach, so to speak, but getting paid for it. And more people
prefer chocolate to spinach.
Thus, demand response’s beneficial role in the grid does not
come close to telling the full story of how it came to be at the
center of today’s grid modernization efforts. If everyone in the
industry had recognized its importance from the start, no policies
would have been needed to encourage it. But that was not the case.
So, to begin to understand demand response’s importance, we need
to go back to the 1970s, when it was hardly anything at all.
II.

DEMAND RESPONSE 1.0: THE RISE AND FALL OF
“DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT”
The path of demand-side participation in the grid has not been
a linear upward trajectory. This Part discusses the first generation
of demand-side participation in the grid, spanning from the 1970s
to early 2000s. “Demand-side management” (“DSM”), the
umbrella term for all demand-side measures, began modestly in the
1970s, had its heyday in the 1980s and 1990s, and fell off
significantly during the move to retail competition in the electric
industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s, to recover somewhat
later. As discussed more fully in Part III, “demand response” arose
in the early 2000s after the fall off in demand-side measures
contributed to a catastrophe in California.
But before this, there was little to no demand response for
many decades in the electricity industry.
A. Demand Response “0.0”: Little Demand-Side Participation
Like much of contemporary energy law and policy, demandside measures have their origins in the energy crises of the 1970s.
Think of the era before then as “demand response 0.0.” There was
“little urgency”54 for measures to reduce consumer electricity
Nest itself is struggling. Mark Bergen, With $340 Million in Revenue, Nest is
Underperforming, and its Future at Google is at Risk, RECODE.NET (Mar 30,
2016, 5:19 PM EDT), http://www.recode.net/2016/3/30/11587388/nest-2015sales-budget.
54
STEVEN BRAITHWAIT ET AL., EDISON ELEC. INST., RETAIL ELECTRICITY
PRICING AND RATE DESIGN IN EVOLVING MARKETS 43 (2007),
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demand. Utilities considered the idea of paying their customers to
cut back their consumption to be preposterous.55 They did not need
to. Costs of generating electricity were low, and going lower all the
time as improving economies of scale made it cheaper to build new
plants and generate more electricity. Postwar prosperity brought
the convenience of the “all-electric home.” The “Live Better
Electrically” campaign that promoted it, with then-actor Ronald
Reagan as its notable spokesman, was “[o]ne of the most effective
mass marketing home campaigns of all time.”56 The industry
mascot Reddy Kilowatt promoted more uses of electricity.57 The
California utility PG&E had this pithy slogan: “Don’t Be A
Dishwasher, Buy One.”58
It was an era of coziness between PUCs and the (mostly)
vertically integrated utility companies that they regulated. Cost-ofservice ratemaking’s familiar “throughput incentive”59 encouraged
capital spending on new power plants, as costs incurred could be
recovered from ratepayers with relatively few limitations. There
was no incentive to reduce demand, which would reduce profits.60
Utilities sold power, and their customers bought it. As late as 1981,
http://eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/Retail_Electricity_Pric
ing.pdf.
55
BRETT D. STEELE & THEO BREITENSTEIN, THE HISTORY AND EVOLVEMENT
OF ELECTRICAL PEAK LOAD CONTROL SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. 2
(2010),
http://emacx.com/documents/TheHistoryandEvolvementofElectricalPeakLoadC
ontrolSystems_002.pdf (terming this notion “absurd”).
56
Live Better Electrically: The Gold Medallion Home Campaign, WASH.
DEP’T OF ARCHAEOLOGY AND HISTORY PRES., http://www.dahp.wa.gov/livebetter-electrically-the-gold-medallion-electric-home-campaign (last visited Mar.
14, 2017).
57
About
Reddy
Kilowatt,
REDDYKILOWATT.ORG,
http://www.reddykilowatt.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
58
Stephen P. Reynolds & Jane F. Christopherson, Public Policy and Price Per
kWh, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 83, 84 (1984).
59
Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
60
JOSEPH ETO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF U.S. UTILITY DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 4–5 (1996),
https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/39931.pdf; STEELE & BREITENSTEIN, supra
note 55, at 2.
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Clark Gellings, one of the originators of the term “DSM,”
described venturing behind a customer’s electric meter as going
into “forbidden territory.”61
Even though they were shunned, strategies to reduce electricity
demand did exist. Decades earlier, “engineers and utilities debated
alternative pricing regimes that included charges at times of high
demand and time-of-day differentiated rates.”62 Basic demand-side
measures were around, if not used widely. As the noted industry
analyst Ahmad Faruqui put it, “[d]irect load control of certain
residential appliances such as water heaters and air conditioners
and interruptible and curtailable rates for commercial and
industrial customers” existed before 1970.63 In 1968, Detroit
Edison started the first DLC program.64
But measures to reduce demand were not more widely adopted,
because utilities were largely uninterested in them. For quite a few
utilities, that antipathy65 persists to this day and informs
discussions about demand response.

61

Shmuel S. Oren, Demand Response: An Historical Perspective and
Business Models for Load Control Aggregation, Feb. 1, 2010, at slide 5 (citing
Clark W. Gellings, Demand-side Load Management: The Rising Cost of PeakDemand Power Means that Utilities Must Encourage Customers to Manage
Power Usage, 18 IEEE SPECTRUM 49 (Dec. 1981)).
62
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INCORPORATING RENEWABLES INTO THE
ELECTRIC
GRID
26–27
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160616_ce
a_renewables_electricgrid.pdf.
63
Ahmad Faruqui, The Rediscovery of Demand-Side Management, slide 6
(2011),
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/004/439/original/The_Red
iscovery_of_DemandSide_Management_Faruqui_Jan_19_2012.pdf?1378772105.
64
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE
AND ADVANCED METERING 23 n.26 (2011), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staffreports/2010-dr-report.pdf [hereinafter FERC DR-AM 2010].
65
STEELE & BREITENSTEIN, supra note 55, at 3 (noting “hostile utility
industry attitudes towards conservation and load curtailment [that] slowly
started to change” in the 1970s).
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B. The 1970s and 1980s: Reducing Demand Becomes More
Common
In the 1970s, outright hostility to demand-side measures
softened when three significant trends coincided and changed the
future of demand-side participation in the grid. Since then, federal
and state programs and initiatives have encouraged reduced
electricity consumption and improved energy efficiency.
1.

Three Trends Catalyze Attention to the Demand Side
The rapid growth of residential air conditioning, beginning in
the mid-1950s and accelerating into the 1970s and 1980s,66
changed the demand curve for utilities.67 They now had peaks in
demand during the middle of the day and needed extra power
plants to meet that peak demand. These extra “peaking” plants
would not be used for the rest of the year.68 It made sense to find
some way to shift usage outside the utility’s peak hours, to reduce
costs and the need for new plants.
Also, the cost of both fuel and new power plants escalated. In
the mid- to late-1970s and early 1980s, building new power plants
(particularly nuclear plants) became more expensive.69 The
unexpected high costs of nuclear plants, combined with the
growing societal awareness of the impacts of nuclear power
generation and opposition to new plants, led to plant cancellations
and adverse impacts on utility profitability.70 After the Arab oil
66

MAXIMILIAN AUFFHAMMER, REPORT #3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR
CONDITIONING
ADOPTION
AND
TEMPERATURE
3
(2011),
https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0573-01.pdf/$file/EE-057301.pdf (noting that “in 1955 the residential air conditioner penetration in the
United States was below 2% nationally” but “[a] quarter of a century later that
fraction had risen to 50%, with half of those households having installed central
air-conditioning units.”); Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 393
(“Nationally, the presence of air conditioning in new single-family homes
increased from 49% in 1973 to 89% in 2006.”).
67
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 393.
68
Id.
69
See, e.g., Reynolds & Christopherson, supra note 58, at 85–86 (detailing
cost increases for the California utility PG&E).
70
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Jersey Central Power & Light Co v Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission: Robert Bork on Public Utility Rate
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embargo of 1973, fuel prices went up and so too did electricity
prices,71 which, to an extent not seen before, prompted new
attention to “energy independence” and caused customers to cut
back on their demand.72
In addition, the burgeoning environmental movement brought
increasing attention to the externalities of electricity generation.
The rise of environmentalism brought more participation and
contention to ratemaking proceedings,73 and promoted a new ethic
of using less instead of building more. Cutting consumption
became virtuous. President Jimmy Carter wore a sweater in the
White House and urged Americans to conserve energy.74 And there
was increasing academic interest in an electricity future that was
not all about Reddy Kilowatt. In 1978, MIT Professor Fred
Schweppe described a “homeostatic” electric grid in which supply
and demand balanced at equilibrium.75 Schweppe and other
scholars saw a future in which both supply (power plants) and
cutting back demand contributed to this balance. He proposed the
use of price signals, market mechanisms, and communication
technologies to prompt cuts in demand when necessary to achieve
this balance.76

Regulation—and Lochner v New York, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 193
(2013).
71
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES OF ELECTRICITY,
1960-2011,
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.php?t=ptb0810 (showing
increases in nominal electricity prices in the 1970s after stable prices had
prevailed before then).
72
RICHARD F. HIRSH, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 126–27 (1989).
73
See, e.g., Reynolds & Christopherson, supra note 58, at 88 (listing ten
groups “to name only a few” that had “sprung up” to intervene in utility
proceedings in California).
74
Peter Dykstra, President Jimmy Carter Tried to Change the Path of
America’s Energy Future with His ‘Crisis of Confidence’ Speech, Delivered 35
Years Ago Monday. Here’s Why it Didn’t Work, THE DAILY CLIMATE (July 15,
2014), http://www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2014/07/carter-crisis-speechanniversary (describing the “crisis of confidence” speech).
75
MIT ENERGY INIT., supra note 3, at 35.
76
Id.

374

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 1

For most of the 1970s, however, demand-side programs could
best be described as “modest.”77 In 1979, less than 30 percent of
investor-owned utilities had interruptible rate programs.78 And
there was a “wink wink agreement”79 that utilities would not
interrupt their customers,80 so these programs merely established a
lower default rate for commercial and industrial customers that
demanded these rates for continuing to purchase power.81 Dynamic
pricing experiments began in several utilities in the mid-1970s.82 In
1975, the Federal Energy Administration, the forerunner of the
DOE, conducted sixteen rate demonstration projects.83 It was not
until the 1980s, though, that any utility would start a dynamic
pricing program in earnest.
2.

PURPA and the Growth of DSM
During the 1970s, federal statutes established a national policy
of encouraging efficiency and conservation, and prodded utilities
into action. The core statute involving utilities was the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”).84 Utilities
began to seriously conduct DSM programs by the end of the
decade,85 as state PUCs acted to empower electric utilities to
recover costs associated with DSM programs in keeping with
PURPA’s mandate encouraging DSM investments. A significant
77

ETO, supra note 60, at vii.
Caves et al., supra note 15, at 51 (discussing a 1987 study by the Electric
Power Research Institute).
79
STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES:
MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 31 (2015).
80
HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 19; DANIEL F. KOHLER & BRIDGER M.
MITCHELL, RESPONSE TO RESIDENTIAL TIME-OF-USE ELECTRICITY RATES 6
(1983) (citing a report by the Peak Load Management Alliance observing that,
“[M]any utilities rarely if ever interrupted these customers. So with the rate
discount, such programs evolved more for purposes of economic development
than for load management.”).
81
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 12.
82
KOHLER & MITCHELL, supra note 80, at v.
83
See id. (discussing the results from several of these projects).
84
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–617 (1978)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)) [hereinafter PURPA].
85
Eric Hirst et al., The Future of DSM in a Restructured U.S. Electricity
Industry, 24 ENERGY POL’Y 303, 303 (1996).
78
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number of utilities adopted programs with measures to encourage
customers to reduce electricity usage through improvements to
efficiency and increased conservation.86
PURPA’s demand-side provisions, set forth in Title I, aimed to
encourage conservation of energy supplied by electric utilities,
optimal efficiency of electric utility facilities and resources, and
equitable rates for electric consumers. PURPA did not mandate
that utilities undertake specific actions but instead encouraged the
states to adopt regulatory policies.87 It set forth six specific federal
standards for utilities’ services and rates: (i) rates should reflect the
actual cost of electric power generation and distribution; (ii) rates
should not decline with increases in electric power use unless the
cost of providing the power decreases as consumption increases;
(iii) rates should reflect the daily variations in the actual cost of
electric power generation; (iv) rates should reflect the seasonal
variations in the actual cost of electric power generation; (v) rates
should offer a special “interruptible” electric power service rate for
commercial and industrial customers; and (vi) each electric utility
must offer load management techniques to their electric consumers
that will be practicable, cost effective and reliable, as determined
by the state public utility commission.88 State PUCs were required
to consider whether adopting these standards would further
PURPA’s objectives.
“Demand‑side management” emerged in the early 1980s as the
umbrella term for energy efficiency, conservation programs, and
initiatives aimed at reducing electricity demand.89 Broadly
speaking, DSM programs can be divided into seven categories: (1)
information provision; (2) technical strategies such as energy
audits; (3) financial assistance for adoption of energy-efficient
technologies; (4) “direct or free installation of energy-efficient
technologies;” (5) performance contracting, “in which a third party
contracts with both the utility and a customer and guarantees
86

Nadel & Geller, supra note 34, at 291–94 (describing typical programs).
PURPA § 111.
88
PURPA § 111(d)(1)–(6).
89
As Ahmad Faruqui notes, the “DSM” term was invented in 1983 at an
industry workshop. Faruqui, supra note 63, at 8.
87
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energy performance”; (6) load management; and (7) dynamic
pricing.90 Thus, although they sound similar, “demand-side
management” and “demand response” are different, as the latter
encompasses only the last two on this list.
Another federal statute promoting DSM was the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 (“EPAct 1992”), which encouraged “integrated
resource planning” (“IRP”). IRP has two components: an
assessment of future electric needs, and a plan to meet the
projected future needs. It is “integrated” because it evaluates both
traditional supply side resources (building new power plants and
transmission lines) and demand-side resources (energy efficiency
and demand response) in making decisions about how best to meet
projected future electric energy needs.91 By explicitly adding
consideration of demand-side resources to utility planning, IRP
aimed to change the traditional pattern of building more supply to
meet projected demand. EPAct 1992 amended PURPA to add three
new standards for state consideration, two of which were the use of
IRP and the encouragement of DSM investments by making them
as profitable as supply-side investments.92 This latter statutory
standard requires that state regulators link a utility’s rates and
recovery of its costs to its performance in implementing costeffective DSM programs.93 Spurred by the statutory requirement, a
number of state PUCs adopted IRP to modify the process of
regulating the supply of electricity provided by electric utilities.94
DSM programs grew rapidly in the 1980s, as state regulators
responded to the PURPA mandate and provided incentives for
utilities. A 1982 survey found a “virtual stampede,” as 72 percent
of U.S. utilities had conservation programs and two-thirds had load

90

ETO, supra note 60, at 2.
RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 2
(2013),
http://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rapsynapsewilsonbiewald-bestpracticesinirp-2013-jun-21.pdf.
92
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 115, 106 Stat. 2776,
2803 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(8) (2012)).
93
16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(8).
94
WILSON & BIEWALD, supra 91, at 3.
91
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management programs;95 half had been established since 1980.96
By 1993, electric utility DSM programs reached $2.7 billion of
utility spending, or about one percent of U.S. utility revenues.97
Notably lagging, however, were dynamic pricing programs.
California’s utility PG&E started a real-time pricing program in
the mid-1980s,98 which was largely unsuccessful due to its design.
Two other utilities (Niagara Mohawk and Georgia Power) started
more robust programs in the late 1980s and early 1990s.99 Even
today, only a few dynamic pricing programs are successful.100
Overall, little progress has been made in signing up residential
customers.101
3.

The Decline of DSM In Restructuring
Demand-side programs experienced a sharp reversal of fortune
when program mandates were swept away in the late 1990s. The
chief culprit was the introduction of partial competition into the
utility industry, known as “restructuring.”102 Restructuring was
prompted by advances in technology, regulatory initiatives
promoting competition in the industry,103 the emergence of new,
nonutility (or “merchant”) generators, and societal and economic
arguments for ending utilities’ monopolies, at least for electricity
95

CHRISTOPHER FLAVIN, WORLDWATCH INST., ELECTRICITY’S FUTURE: THE
SHIFT TO EFFICIENCY AND SMALL-SCALE POWER 85 (1984); see also
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 394 (describing the rise of load
management programs in the mid 1980s and early 1990s).
96
FLAVIN, supra note 95, at 85.
97
ETO, supra note 60, at vii.
98
BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 54, at 44.
99
Id.
100
DAN YORK & MARTIN KUSHLER, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGYEFFICIENT ECON., EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMAND RESPONSE
AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY iv (2005) (observing that, “With a few noteworthy
exceptions, only a few [dynamic pricing programs] have achieved significant
absolute or relative impacts in terms of load reductions achieved.”).
101
Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In Residential
Dynamic Electricity Pricing 1 (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 18037, 2012).
102
ETO, supra note 60, at 1.
103
See generally ISSER, supra note 79, at 152–207; Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory
Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric
Utility Deregulation, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 545, 549–51 (2005).
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generation. The story of retail and wholesale restructuring has been
studied extensively,104 and I will not repeat it here. Retail choice
had incomplete success and outright failure in some states, which
led to a balkanized system today where some states enable
customers to choose their electricity generator, but most do not.105
The fate of DSM programs during this time period is also well
known. Proponents feared that the programs would suffer the ax in
a more competitive environment.106 If utilities were required to pay
for them, and their upstart competitors were not, price-elastic
customers would presumably switch,107 so utilities argued that they
should not bear the programs’ costs.108 The result was predictable.
Spending on utility DSM peaked in the early 1990s,109 but after
that, utility support waned, and total spending on DSM programs
declined by almost half between 1993 and 2001.110 States repealed

104

ISSER, supra note 79, at 233–74, for example, evaluates the rise and fall of
competition in California. See also David B. Spence, Can Law Manage
Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 779–81 (2008).
105
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATUS OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING BY
STATE,
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2017).
106
Hirst et al., supra note 85, at 304.
107
Id. at 305; ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR
ELECTRIC ENERGY, PURSUANT TO SECTION 1815 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF
2005 97 (2006) (observing that this was particularly true when distribution
utilities were required under restructuring laws to maintain “provider of last
resort” offerings to ensure service to all customers).
108
See ISSER, supra note 79, at 192; Nadel & Geller, supra note 34, at 290.
109
See Hirst et al., supra note 85, at 304.
110
RICHARD COWART, REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, EFFICIENT
RELIABILITY: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF DEMAND-SIDE RESOURCES IN POWER
SYSTEMS AND MARKETS v–vi (2001). Meanwhile, unfortunately, the
contribution of utility-sponsored demand-side management programs (DSM) to
meeting the nation’s load growth needs has been in decline. In the early 1990’s,
utility DSM programs saved a total of 29,000 MW at a cost of about three cents
per kWh saved. Despite this generally solid record of success, since the passage
of the Energy Policy Act and the national move to retail electric competition,
utility-sponsored DSM programs have been cut back sharply. Total utility DSM
spending has declined by about fifty percent since 1993.
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IRP requirements.111 The federal government’s treasure trove of
energy data, the Energy Information Administration, stopped
keeping track of DSM spending after 2001.112
The decline of DSM illustrates how opponents of demand-side
programs can modify their arguments to suit the times. DSM
spending cratered because it was a burden to utilities that hobbled
their ability to compete with market entrants who were not
required to carry out these programs. It was the advent of
competition, not DSM’s inherent merits, which prompted the
decline.
III.

DEMAND RESPONSE 2.0: THE ADVENT AND GROWTH OF
“DEMAND RESPONSE”
This Part begins with yet another reversal, this time in the
opposite direction: the growth of demand response programs in
wholesale electricity markets after the California electricity crisis
of 2000-2001. Since then, wholesale market programs have
evolved, and FERC Orders have attempted to put demand response
on a comparable footing with generation in these markets,113 yet
barriers to demand response participation persist.
Just as utility DSM spending was dropping off, events in
California intervened. The state’s electricity crisis was centered on
the aborted move to electricity competition. There were numerous
As one example of this trend, New York utilities’ energy efficiency spending
“was cut by about 75% in the mid-1990’s.” Id. at 15; cf. Wellinghoff &
Morenoff, supra note 18 (demand reduction programs also “dropped off”).
111
WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 91, at 3.
112
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC UTILITY DEMAND SIDE
MANAGEMENT - ARCHIVE, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/dsm/ (last
visited Feb. 28, 2017).
113
As noted throughout this Article, demand response cannot receive the
exact same treatment as electricity generated from power plants, because it
involves different kinds of resources. Regulatory treatment that attempts to
achieve comparability often results in different market rules for the two types of
resources. Infra Part III; for a specific recent example, see Indep. Mkt. Monitor
for PJM v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 155 FERC ¶ 61,059 (Apr. 21, 2016)
(denying a Market Monitor’s complaint, and upholding different offer caps for
generation and demand response), https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/commmeet/2016/042116/E-5.pdf.
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structural problems with California’s design for retail competition,
resulting in tremendous economic pressure on both consumers and
the state’s utilities.114 One of the many problems was a disconnect
between wholesale and retail energy markets. When prices in the
state’s new wholesale electricity market spiked as a result of a
confluence of factors that some called a perfect storm,115 there was
no safety valve. Dynamic pricing, then as now, was not
widespread,116 so retail customers paid fixed rates117 that could not
be easily adjusted upward to relieve the price squeeze.
There was no other effective form of demand reductions to
relieve market pressure.118 At the time, all three of California’s
major investor-owned utilities had interruptible rate programs, but
they had rarely been used.119 This situation changed dramatically
during the crisis. Utilities issued more frequent calls to reduce
demand from interruptible customers.120 The number escalated into
2000,121 when power prices spiked. Customers refused these
demands and then balked at paying penalties imposed on them for
refusing.122
A. The Ascent of “Demand Response”
As was noted at the time, “Competitive wholesale markets . . .
resemble the sound of one hand clapping. They are often
114

For a detailed discussion of this, see ISSER, supra note 79, at 233–74. See
also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“In
2000, wholesale prices for electricity in California increased dramatically and
resulted in the now-infamous California energy crisis.”).
115
ISSER, supra note 79, at 233. The factors included high demand, market
manipulation, and, as discussed infra, the lack of effective demand response.
116
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, LOAD AS A RELIABILITY RESOURCE IN
RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 32 (2003).
117
BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 54, at 5.
118
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 116, at 32.
119
Id. As Isser observes, demand response programs were created during the
crisis, but did not blunt the impacts of the shortages. See ISSER, supra note 79, at
254.
120
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, supra note 116, at 32.
121
The programs were called five, two, and thirteen times in 1998, 1999, and
2000, respectively. Id.
122
See HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 21; see also CAL. ENERGY COMM’N,
supra note 116, at 28; STEELE & BREITENSTEIN, supra note 55, at 4.
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inefficient and not fully competitive, in part because retailcustomer loads do not participate in these markets.”123 Studies
demonstrated this, showing that a small amount of grid WD-40
would have reduced California’s spiking wholesale prices
considerably.124 The availability of real-time pricing for
commercial and industrial customers could have reduced peak
demand in California by 2.5% and wholesale market prices by
24%.125 Another report estimated that if demand could have been
reduced by 5% it would have cut wholesale prices in half.126
In the early 2000s, at roughly the same time as California’s
market was melting down, the nation’s grid operators and their
wholesale markets were rapidly emerging.127 With the advent of the
wholesale markets, the goals of demand-side programs needed to
shift.128 The urge to avoid repeating the California debacle led to a
“near-universal” sentiment that wholesale markets needed some

123

Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 391 (quoting HIRST & KIRBY,
infra note 126, at v).
124
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 395 (quoting BRAITHWAIT &
EAKIN, supra note 38) (“[E]ven modest amounts of demand response can lead to
significant reductions in wholesale prices at times of capacity constraints.”).
125
Steven Braithwait & Ahmad Faruqui, The Choice Not to Buy: Energy
Savings and Policy Alternatives for Demand Response, 139 No. 6 PUB. UTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY 48, 53 (Mar. 15, 2001).
126
ERIC HIRST & BRENDAN KIRBY, EDISON ELEC. INST., RETAIL-LOAD
PARTICIPATION IN COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS v fig. S-1
(2001); cf. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 395–96 (noting that
President Gordon van Welie observed that cutting demand five percent in ISONew England would save $580 million annually).
127
ISSER, supra note 79, at 208–16. Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland
Interconnection (“PJM”), for example, became an ISO in 1997 and an RTO in
2002. Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, 81 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,257 (1997), order on rehr’g and clarification, 92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,282 (2000);
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 101 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,345 (2002).
128
Steven M. Brown, DSM/Load Management Evolves into Demand
Response,
ELEC.
LIGHT
&
POWER
(Mar.
1,
2002),
http://www.elp.com/articles/powergrid_international/print/volume-7/issue2/features/dsm-load-management-evolves-into-demand-response.html (noting
that “many view demand response as the new, possibly more politically correct
name for demand side management,” while acknowledging and describing its
differences).
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form of demand-side participation;129 that was “undeniable.”130
“Demand response” emerged as the umbrella term for techniques
using demand reductions to balance supply and demand in
wholesale markets131 or balance a utility’s system, referring to “all
customer changes in actions or behaviors that introduce price
elasticity into the wholesale market or that can be used to increase
system reliability.”132 In part, this was also a re-branding. Being
mandated to do DSM programs was not something utilities wanted
to hear in 2002.133
This inflection point in the industry’s transformation marked
the first uses of the term “demand response.” By summer 2001,
four grid operators had demand response programs.134 Reports
from 2001 and 2002135 evaluated demand response’s value to
markets. FERC and the DOE held a “Demand Response
Conference” in 2002, and also in 2002, FERC stated that the
“Standard Market Design” (SMD)—a bold attempt to standardize
the wholesale markets136—would include a starring role for
demand response. “Demand response,” FERC observed in its
working paper that evolved into the proposal, “is essential in
129

BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 54, at 2; cf. MICHAEL PANFIL & JAMES
FINE, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, PUTTING DEMAND RESPONSE TO WORK FOR
CALIFORNIA 7 (2015) (observing that demand response was “conceived as a
power system resource to provide emergency response and peak load
management during California’s energy crisis”).
130
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 402.
131
Bushnell et al., supra note 11, at 11 (observing in 2009 that, “demand
response has represented a specific paradigm for integrating the consumption
decisions of certain types of customers into wholesale electricity markets. This
paradigm involves identifying a potential reduction in consumption and treating
that reduction as the service provided.”).
132
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 2 (emphasis added).
133
Schare & Feldman, supra note 13.
134
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 3.
135
Id. at 8 (discussing a 2002 report of the Peak Load Management Alliance
on demand response); see also Braithwait & Faruqui, supra note 125. Faruqui,
supra note 63, at 12 refers to this as the origin of the “second generation” of
DSM as will this Article.
136
The SMD rulemaking proposal was Remedying Undue Discrimination
Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market
Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,451 (Oct. 15, 2002). ISSER, supra note 79, at 326–28
(discussing SMD’s features and development).
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competitive markets to assure the efficient interaction of supply
and demand.”137 But SMD met its Waterloo soon thereafter for a
host of reasons mostly unrelated to demand response.138
Introducing and encouraging demand response would be left to
individual grid operators.
B. Evolution of Wholesale Market Programs (2001-2009)
Throughout the 2000s, the RTOs evolved frameworks to
govern the treatment of demand response in their wholesale
markets, which was complicated by several factors, including that
the markets had been established and designed for purchases and
sales of large blocks of power. As barriers to demand response
participation persisted, Congress and FERC acted to address them,
with FERC requiring RTOs to reshape their programs to
accommodate demand response. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs entered
the picture and the role of aggregation grew, with new firms
providing demand response to individual utilities and to the
wholesale markets as intermediaries.139
137

Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Standardized Transmission Service and
Wholesale Electric Market Design 6 (Mar. 15, 2002) (working paper); cf.
NSTAR Servs. Co., 92 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,065 (2000) (showing awareness, two years
earlier, of the adverse impacts of the “lack of demand responsiveness” in the
ISO-New England markets, in an order imposing a bid cap). With numerous
references to how grid operators would change their rules to incorporate demand
response, the proposal made clear that FERC intended to set the “right pricing
signals for investment in transmission and generation facilities, as well as
investment in demand reduction” with markets that “treat demand resources on
an equal footing with supply.” Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open
Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed.
Reg. 55,452 paras. 3, 15 (Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
(emphasis added); see also BRAITHWAIT & EAKIN, supra note 38, at 1 (noting
that the SMD proposal determined that, “the issue is not whether demand
response should play a role in market design, but how to incorporate demand
response into the standard market design on an equal footing with generation
resources in order to achieve effective market performance.”); KATHAN, supra
note 30, at 8.
138
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ELECTRICITY MARKETS: CONSUMERS
COULD BENEFIT FROM DEMAND PROGRAMS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 3
(2004); see also ISSER, supra note 79, at 327–28 (discussing the “widespread
backlash” against the SMD proposal).
139
HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 21.
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Some caveats are needed to better frame this discussion. First,
we might use the more precise term “demand response in
organized wholesale energy markets” (as FERC does140) to focus
on markets administered by RTOs, as bilateral wholesale
transactions take place outside of these markets.141 For the sake of
brevity, the remainder of this discussion uses “wholesale markets”
to mean those conducted by RTOs. Second, a minority of electric
customers is in areas that do not have these organized markets
(such as most of North Carolina, for example142) and are served in
large part by traditional vertically integrated investor-owned
utilities.143 Some utilities in these areas have adopted demand
management programs.144 Utility-sponsored demand response can
140

Order 745, supra note 7; cf. HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 24 (making a
similar distinction).
141
ELECTRIC MKTS. RES. FOUND., COMPETITION IN BILATERAL WHOLESALE
ELECTRIC MARKETS: HOW DOES IT WORK? 3 (Feb. 2016),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2016/Bilateral%20Markets%20White
%20Paper%20Final.pdf.
142
Electric
Industry,
N.C.
UTIL.
COMM’N,
http://www.ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/industries/electric/electric.htm
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2017) (NCUC regulates rates of the states’ three investor-owned
utilities); JONAS MONAST ET AL., ILLUMINATING THE ENERGY POLICY AGENDA:
ELECTRICITY SECTOR ISSUES FACING THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 2 (2016)
(showing FERC map of RTO territories with part of eastern North Carolina in
PJM).
143
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at xvii (“[D]emand response is
viewed and evaluated differently in regions with ISO- or RTO-managed
organized spot markets than in regions with vertically integrated utilities with a
monopoly franchise. Vertically integrated utilities internalize and pass through
all of their energy production, transmission and distribution costs, so they (and
their regulators) take a long-term view and evaluate demand response against
the alternative of building (or buying) new generation. Thus, utilities with retail
monopolies evaluate and measure demand response benefits primarily in terms
of avoided capacity costs over the long run. In contrast, regions with organized
wholesale markets have active energy trading opportunities with transparent
market clearing prices (and in four of the seven ISO/RTO regions, no
comparable capacity market), so they tend to evaluate demand response benefits
primarily in terms of time-varying energy and capacity values in competitive
markets. This view frames demand response benefits in the short run, and tends
to understate long-term benefits.”).
144
HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 25. An example is the “Smart Hours”
program of Oklahoma utility OG&E, https://oge.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2017).
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benefit a utility in numerous ways even where demand reductions
are not bid into wholesale markets,145 for example, potentially
allowing deferral of new power plant costs.146 FERC has no
jurisdiction over these programs.147
Moreover, in states within grid operators’ footprints, customers
can take part in wholesale market programs, and in programs
offered by utilities. There is overlap between the programs, as, for
example, in regions such as PJM, a utility can use demand
reductions in the programs it conducts to meet its own
obligations148 to provide capacity.

145

HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 25.
Katie Fehrenbacher, How Alphabet’s Nest Helps Utilities Cope with
Summer
Heat
Waves,
FORTUNE
(Aug.
29,
2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/08/29/alphabet-nest-thermostat-summer/
(describing
SCE’s strategy of investing in demand response and storage as a result of losing
a source of fuel to its peaking natural gas plants).
147
HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 25.
148
PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, LOAD MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE
REPORT 2009/2010 4 https://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/dsr/loadmanagement-performance-report-2009-2010.ashx (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
146
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The following graphic depicts the myriad of entities involved
in utility demand management and wholesale market programs:149

RTOs administer both emergency and economic demand
response programs.150 Also, they typically have as many as three
distinctly different types of wholesale markets, and demand
response participates differently into each type. These markets are:

149

CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 4. A color version of Figure 1 can be
found online at http://ncjolt.org/.
150
Order 745, supra note 7, at 16,660; PETER CAPPERS ET AL., DEMAND
RESPONSE IN U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 11–14 (2009)
(describing programs as of 2009).
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(1) Energy: In an energy market, utilities and other loadserving entities151 purchase electricity for delivery within the next
hour or a day ahead. Demand response resources have participated
in energy markets to substitute for electricity sold at the market
price, as discussed in FERC v. EPSA.
(2) Capacity: Some, but not all RTOs, have developed
“capacity” markets to provide additional incentives for new power
plant construction. A capacity market is a forward-looking market,
in which participants commit to serve future demand with new
generating capacity.152 Thus, a bid in a capacity market is
essentially a standby promise that demonstrates the bidder’s ability
to deliver electricity in the future to meet demand. These markets
focus on “installed capacity”—resources a utility or other loadserving entity must have available to serve customers—either by
owning and operating power plants or by purchasing capacity in
the market. Demand response participates in these markets by
substituting for other forms of capacity. In the PJM region, for
example, a mandatory commitment to be available as needed to
reduce demand is most frequently compensated in the capacity
market.153
(3) Ancillary services: These markets compensate providers of
“regulation” (an industry term of art for keeping grid frequency in
balance) and several different types of reserve services that enable
the reliable transmission of electricity.154 Ancillary service markets

151

A “load-serving entity” is an entity that “secures energy and Transmission
Service (and related Interconnected Operations Services) to serve the electrical
demand and energy requirements of its end-use customers.” N. AM. ELEC.
RELIABILITY CORP., STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE REGISTRY CRITERIA Appx. 5B
(2015),
http://www.nerc.com/FilingsOrders/us/RuleOfProcedureDL/Appendix_5B_Regi
strationCriteria_20150319.pdf.
152
See generally Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 ECON. OF
ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 47 (2013).
153
MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2016 QUARTERLY STATE OF THE MARKET
REPORT FOR PJM: JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 255 (2016),
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2016/2
016q3-som-pjm-sec6.pdf.
154
Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 51, at 203.
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still have comparatively little demand response participation,155 but
demand response can increasingly help provide services such as
frequency regulation.156
Wholesale market programs have always faced criticism as an
inefficient way station to dynamic pricing, being perennially
susceptible to the argument that dynamic pricing would be more
efficient.157 Yet if “the most important barrier to demand response
in wholesale markets is the lack of dynamic pricing,”158 then we
need wholesale market programs if we are to have any demandside participation at all for quite some time to come.159 Moreover,
unlike wholesale market programs, grid operators cannot
implement dynamic pricing. Only state PUCs can do that, as it
directly changes retail rates,160 and they have been reluctant to act.
In recognition of this, some commentators who are skeptical about
demand response accept wholesale market programs if they are
properly limited.161

155

The reasons for this are discussed at length in JASON MACDONALD ET AL.,
LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., DEMAND RESPONSE PROVIDING ANCILLARY
SERVICES: A COMPARISON OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE US
WHOLESALE MARKETS (2012).
156
FERC’s Order 755 changed the policies for pricing of frequency regulation
service. Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale
Power Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,260 (Oct. 20, 2011). Infra notes 272–282 and
accompanying text (discussing barriers addressed by this pricing policy).
157
See, e.g., WILLIAM W. HOGAN, DEMAND RESPONSE COMPENSATION, NET
BENEFITS AND COST ALLOCATION: PRELIMINARY COMMENTS 6 (2010),
http://lmpmarketdesign.com/papers/Hogan_DR_Tech_Conf_091310.pdf.
158
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 41.
159
That the need for wholesale market programs is apparent due to the lack of
dynamic pricing has been recognized for well over a decade, suggesting the
obvious: it might be another decade or more before this is not the case.
BRAITHWAIT & EAKIN, supra note 38, at 4 (“The current environment of largely
regulated retail prices and little dynamic pricing arguably creates an apparent
need for ISO/RTO market intervention to encourage some form of demand
response.”).
160
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 2; cf. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18,
at 413 (noting that when FERC intervened in the California crisis, “it stated that
‘State regulators have the most significant authorities to encourage demand
reduction measures.’”).
161
Pierce, supra note 7.
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1.
RTOs’ Demand Response Programs and the Role of
Aggregators
By summer 2001, four RTOs had demand response programs:
in addition to California, these included ISO-New England, New
York, and PJM Interconnection.162 In 2001, FERC accepted PJM’s
proposed Load Response Program163 with an Emergency Option
and Economic Option.164 Also in 2001, the New York ISO began
an emergency-based program (the Emergency Demand Response
Program), and an economic program in its energy market (the DayAhead Demand Bidding Program).165 Since 1999, New York ISO
had in place the ICAP-SCR (Installed Capacity-Special Case
Resources) program, which allowed participants to be designated
“Special Case Resources” if they had the ability to reduce demand
when called.166 As utilities and load-serving entities could use these
resources to meet their installed capacity requirements, this was
(and is today)167 a true capacity market. As noted below, these
programs have been supplemented since then by other markets in
the various regions.

162

KATHAN, supra note 30, at 3.
Id. at 8; Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 402.
164
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 18.
165
COWART, supra note 110, at 15 (discussing the origins of these programs
as a result of studies indicating constrained electricity supplies in New York.
FERC’s approval of the New York ISO programs drew a jurisdictional objection
similar to that which would be made later against Order 745: demand reductions
involved retail customers and fell within state PUC jurisdiction.); JASON R.
SALMI KLOTZ, FERC POLICY ON DEMAND RESPONSE AND ORDER 719 3 (2009),
http://www.gridwiseac.org/pdfs/forum_papers09/klotz.pdf.
166
Demand Response Programs, N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR,
http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets_operations/market_data/demand_respons
e/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
167
In its most recent filing with FERC about program information and
statistics, the New York ISO describes the EDRP, DADRP, and its other
programs. See generally N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON
DEMAND
RESPONSE
PROGRAMS
(2016)
http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/market_data/demand
_response/Demand_Response/Reports_to_FERC/2017/NYISO%202016%20An
nual%20Report%20on%20Demand%20Response%20Programs_Final.pdf
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT ON DEMAND RESPONSE PROGRAMS].
163
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RTOs’ programs differ widely in their designs of such features
as timing of notification of demand reductions and pricing168 and
payment, although some features are common to most programs.
As an example, the New York ISO emergency-based program
offered customers willing to curtail demand on two hours’ notice
payments based on the higher of LMP or 50 cents per kWh. By
2002, this program had nearly 1500 MW enrolled. Calls in
emergency programs are event-driven, taking place on relatively
few days of the year (usually summer peak demand days169). The
New York ISO economic program enabled retail customers to
participate directly in the day-ahead electricity market by
submitting bids of demand reduction to compete with generation,
but was far less popular than the emergency-based program, due to
a confusing design and other issues.170
The overwhelming majority of demand reductions in the
program’s first year came from actual load reductions, but as much
as 15% of the reductions were offset by commercial and industrial
participants using on-site generators, mostly diesel. Over time, this
would lead to criticism of demand response as neither reducing
demand (but simply shifting it to other times or generation sources)
nor reducing pollution. Also, there was little to no direct
participation by retail customers in these programs.171 Instead, as a
2002 report observed, the participants were utilities, other load168

KATHAN, supra note 30, at 51.
See, e.g., PJM INTERCONNECTION LLC, SUMMARY OF PJM-INITIATED
LOAD MANAGEMENT EVENTS 1991-PRESENT, http://www.pjm.com/markets-andoperations/demand-response.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (summarizing days
in each year on which demand response was called, spanning back to 1991).
170
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 41. This is also true today in New York ISO.
ANNUAL REPORT ON DEMAND RESPONSE, supra note 167, at 4, 5 (showing that
EDRP and ICAP-SCR have 1266.7 MW of capacity enrolled, compared to 106.5
MW in ancillary services markets). Other regions have comparable figures, as
discussed more fully below in the context of barriers to demand response
participation. For example, 99% of PJM demand response is emergency demand
response. MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2016 QUARTERLY STATE OF THE
MARKET REPORT, supra note 153, at 255.
171
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 41. Many factors contributed to this, including
a lack of enabling technologies such as smart meters, as discussed more fully
below for programs throughout the decade.
169
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serving entities, and aggregators (the CSPs discussed above).172
The New York ISO was an early innovator in allowing aggregators
to participate in its programs, permitting CSPs to participate
without being licensed to sell electricity.173 One-quarter of the
participants in New York’s demand response programs in 2001
were CSPs.174
In recent years, CSPs’ aggregation, measurement, and
verification capabilities have improved greatly, through more
widespread deployment of enabling technologies such as “smart
meters,” advanced communications protocols, and intelligent
devices such as programmable thermostats. In the Internet age,
stamped movie receipts are not necessary for measurement and
verification, either. The increasing ability to aggregate resources
can give RTOs more reliable and controllable reductions for a
longer time period, and spread out the risk of customers not
curtailing demand when called.175
Some oppose this form of aggregation as inefficient.176 Utilities
could fulfill this role,177 and indeed they would appear to be
“natural aggregators for ISO demand response programs”178 due to
their direct interaction with their customers and established
systems for interacting with the wholesale markets. On the other
hand, utilities sell electricity, so their incentives to bid aggregated
blocks of demand reductions into wholesale markets are limited.179
172

Id. at 16.
Id.
174
Id.
175
Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 51, at 203–05.
176
For example, in his comments on FERC’s 2008 demand response rule,
Order 719, discussed in more detail below, industry economist Robert Borlick
stated that, “ARCs [aggregators of retail customers] are not the best means for
promoting demand response resources.” Wholesale Competition in Regions with
Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,101 (Oct. 28, 2008)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35.28 (2012)) [hereinafter Order 719].
177
In PJM markets, for example, they are explicitly allowed to do so. PJM
INTERCONNECTION, LLC, PJM MANUAL 11: ENERGY & ANCILLARY SERVICES
OPERATIONS
17
(Rev.
86,
Feb.
1,
2017),
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m11.ashx (explaining that
PJM Members can be CSPs).
178
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 47.
179
Id. at 47.
173
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Independent firms whose primary business is providing demand
response have stronger financial incentives than utilities to grow.180
Larger firms such as EnerNOC, Comverge, and Viridity have
sophisticated business models, providing services to certain
industries or market segments, and developing demand response
solutions for residential customers, although this market is still
small. And they can compete on price and offer more services of
value to customers.181
In the mid-2000s, market opportunities for demand response
began to take off. In particular, the implementation of capacity
markets182 led to an increase in demand response participation.183
For example, the PJM capacity market, the Reliability Pricing
Model (RPM184) began in 2007.185 The RPM is administered in a
series of auctions that occur during a three-year period before the
delivery of electricity.186 The PJM Manual for the capacity market
spells out a detailed set of requirements that resources must meet.
Some requirements are performance characteristics for demand
response, such as the ability to respond within two hours if
called.187 Payments are guaranteed monthly. The guaranteed
180

HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 60.
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 47–48.
182
FERC DR-AM 2010, supra note 64, at 47 (noting that before the advent of
capacity markets, “demand response resources must rely on bilateral contracts
that may not provide the price transparency necessary to ensure that these
resources are fairly compensated and to encourage additional provision of
capacity by new demand response resources”).
183
PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, LOAD MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE
REPORT 2009/2010, supra note 148 (discussing the rise in demand response
performance after the advent of the RPM).
184
PJM
INTERCONNECTION,
LLC,
CAPACITY
MARKET
(RPM),
http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (last visited Feb. 21,
2017). The requirement to purchase capacity is known as the “capacity
obligation.” Id.
185
PJM Interconnection, LLC, 117 FERC ¶ 61,331 (2006) (approving the
RPM).
186
PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION FAQS,
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-baseresidual-auction-faqs.ashx (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
187
PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET
60–63
(Rev.
36,
Dec.
22,
2016),
https://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m18.ashx.
181
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revenue stream and increasing ability of CSPs to meet PJM’s
requirements led to a surge in DR capacity market participation by
the end of the decade. In turn, this made up the lion’s share of PJM
demand response activity.188
While capacity market participation increased, participation in
ancillary services markets increased more slowly, and is still small
today.189 PJM added an ancillary services demand response
program in 2006; the Midwest ISO and New York ISO did so in
2008.190 There are several different types of ancillary services and
different technical requirements for each. As an example, CSPs in
the PJM RTO today offer demand response in “synchronized
reserve” and “frequency regulation” markets. Reserve resources
respond to contingency events, such as the loss of a large generator
or transmission line; one tier of PJM’s “synchronized reserves”
product, for example, requires reserves capable of responding
within 10 minutes.191 Frequency regulation refers to quick
adjustments made to keep the grid in frequency balance. Resources
that provide these adjustments must be available nearly
immediately on a grid operator’s signal.192 Traditionally, only
power plants provided these services,193 but today as technologies

188

See, e.g., MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2016 QUARTERLY STATE OF THE
MARKET REPORT, supra note 153, at 255.
189
Id. (showing a synchronized reserve made up 0.5% of PJM demand
response activity in 2015).
190
N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 112 FERC ¶ 61,283 (2005); Midwest
Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., order on reh’g, 123 FERC ¶ 61,297
(2008); Cal. Indep. Sys. Op., 116 FERC ¶ 61,274 (2006); PJM Interconnection,
LLC, 114 FERC ¶ 61,201 (2006).
191
PJM INTERCONNECTION LLC, PJM MANUAL 11: ENERGY & ANCILLARY
SERVICES
OPERATIONS
83
(Rev.
86,
Feb.
1,
2017),
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/manuals/m11.ashx (last visited Feb.
21, 2017) [hereinafter PJM MANUAL 11]; see HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at
44 (describing reserves generally).
192
PJM MANUAL 11, supra note 191, at 65 (stating that there is a requirement
for being able to follow an automatic generation control (AGC) signal); HURLEY
ET AL., supra note 50, at 45.
193
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at vii.
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improve, and, in particular, as demand response becomes more
automated,194 it is capable of providing many of these services.195
With these and other developments came more opportunities
for CSPs, such as the ability to bid into multiple markets, often
simultaneously with the same resource. However, barriers to
participation persist today. The next section discusses the wide
range of barriers that have been identified and addressed over the
course of the past fifteen years.
2.

Barriers To Demand Response Participation
Despite promising developments, during the first half of the
2000s there was suboptimal demand response participation in
wholesale markets,196 and even now there is little residential
participation.197 FERC has estimated potential reductions in peak
demand of up to 20%,198 but concluded that only a fraction of this
potential has been realized. There are many different reasons for
this underperformance, including economic, regulatory and
technological barriers. To understand the policies implemented in
the foundational FERC Orders on demand response, it is necessary
to understand these barriers.
From the outset, because demand response is fundamentally
different from generation,199 it struggled to find a level playing

194

Id. at 23; Marc Frincu et al., Enabling Automated Dynamic Demand
Response: From Theory to Practice, http://saimacs.github.io/pubs/2015eenergy-group.pdf (discussing challenges in building automated demand
response systems). Automating demand response is of particularly keen interest
to aggregators because without it, “[t]he process of sending and aggregating the
responses from multiple parties is notoriously cumbersome and time
consuming.” Scott Neumann et al., How to Get More Response from Demand
Response, 19 THE ELECTRICITY J. 24, 28 (2006).
195
HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 45.
196
Id. at 22.
197
Id. at 11; PANFIL & FINE, supra note 129, at 7 (stating that demand
response has “primarily attracted large industrial, agricultural and commercial
consumers”).
198
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND
RESPONSE POTENTIAL x at Fig. ES-1 (2009).
199
See COWART, supra note 110, at 37 (“The focus of most decision-makers
on supply-side solutions to meet load growth and reliability needs is perhaps a
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field in wholesale markets designed to trade power. The markets’
“supply-centric focus”200 created numerous obstacles. As a 2002
report indicated, “designing demand response programs that work
within the supply-based ISO structures has been a challenge.”201
Each year since 2006, as required under the Energy Policy Act of
2005, FERC has identified barriers to greater demand response
participation in wholesale markets in its annual reports on
advanced metering and demand response programs.202 A 2013
report by researchers at the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory (“LBNL”) on demand response203 created a useful
taxonomy to study these barriers in more depth, dividing them into
six categories.
The first category involves threshold barriers, in which the
RTO explicitly excludes demand response from participating
altogether.204 An example is a market rule that disallows demand
response participation in an ancillary services market, as in the
ISO-New England RTO regulation market as recently as 2013.205
The reasons for this might be an RTO’s judgment that demand
response cannot technically provide the service, even if others such
as researchers who study demand response believe this is not
accurate.206 Some RTOs also prohibited aggregators from
providing specific individual ancillary services, further narrowing
market opportunities.207
natural product of the manner in which franchises and electricity markets have
evolved.”); KATHAN, supra note 30, at 34.
200
HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 22.
201
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 9–10.
202
EPAct 2005 section 1252(e)(3) required FERC to prepare an “an annual
report, by appropriate region, that assesses demand response resources.” FERC
has prepared this report - the Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced
Metering - each year since 2006. The most recent report is FERC DR-AM 2016,
supra note 22.
203
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 33–47, lists fifteen pages’ worth of
individual specific barriers in tabular form.
204
The report terms these “[b]arriers associated with Bulk Power System
Service Definitions.” CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at ix; see also HURLEY ET
AL., supra note 50, at 22.
205
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 10.
206
See generally id.
207
HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 11.
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Next, once a demand response resource is eligible to participate
in the market, it must meet that market’s performance-based
rules.208 RTOs’ rules for bidding specify performance parameters
that can restrict demand response participation.209 Performance
criteria can be defined in terms that only a power plant could meet,
such as an ancillary services market rule that required “100 MW of
unloaded, on-line capacity from a large fuel-burning generator”
instead of the more neutral “100 MW of response that can be
delivered within 10 minutes.”210 Another typical barrier is a
minimum size threshold. Often, energy markets have minimum
bids of 1 MW for aggregated bids and 100 Kw for individual
participants, which is a far larger amount than smaller customers
can provide.211 Aggregation can overcome this by combining
demand reductions from individual customers into larger blocks.
However, market rules can sometimes make it difficult for
aggregators to participate.212 Proving that rule barriers persist
today, a controversial “pay for performance” rule is currently the
subject of litigation in the D.C. Circuit.213 This rule prevents
demand response from achieving the highest level of payment in

208

CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 9 (terming these “Attributes of
Performance”).
209
Id. at 11–12 (“In defining the performance attributes required to provide
certain bulk power system services in ISO/RTO jurisdictions . . . ISO/RTOs
have included rules and requirements that may limit the pool of eligible demand
response resources to provide AS (e.g., limitations on resource size, the ability
to aggregate multiple small resources, geographic boundaries of aggregation,
and symmetric response capabilities).”).
210
COWART, supra note 110, at 49 (discussing this with respect to ancillary
services markets).
211
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 47.
212
For an example of a barrier applying to aggregators see Order 719, supra
note 176, at 64,118 (“[E]fforts to aggregate small retail loads have not been
successful primarily due to the requirement that every small resource in an
aggregated group meet the same registration, measurement and verification
standards as large generators.”).
213
Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., No. 16-1234
(D.C. Cir.).
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the PJM capacity market unless it can perform for the entire year,
which seasonal demand response resources cannot do.214
Technology barriers also pose problems.215 The well-known
one is the need for smart meters, which are indispensable216 to
widespread demand-side participation (in the residential sector, in
particular) because precise timing of demand reductions is
essential.217 States have been inconsistent over the years in
providing incentives for utilities to install smart meters. Traditional
regulatory principles require utilities to justify novel investments
by showing that their benefits exceed the costs. Regulators may
disallow cost recovery if they are not convinced of smart meters’
net benefits.218 Even today, smart meter deployment, while
increasing, is not uniform across the nation, and just over 40% of
electricity customers have them.219
214

Under this, the PJM requires that resources must be “capable of sustained,
predictable operation, and are expected to be available and capable of providing
energy and reserves when needed throughout the entire Delivery Year.” PJM
INTERCONNECTION, LLC, SEASONAL CAPACITY RESOURCES SENIOR TASK
FORCE, SEASONAL RESOURCES & RESOURCE AGGREGATION UNDER CP 3 (Apr.
4, 2016),
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/taskforces/scrstf/20160404/20160404-item-05-education-session.ashx (last visited
Feb. 22, 2017). Aggregations of seasonally available resources such as
residential air conditioning demand would be ineligible. Bentham Paulos, Green
Groups Challenge PJM’s Capacity Performance Rules, POWER (July 11, 2016),
http://www.powermag.com/green-groups-challenge-pjms-capacity-performancerules/.
215
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 10 (defining these “Enabling
Infrastructure Investments”).
216
The need for smart meters for effective demand response has been
identified for many years. See, e.g., KATHAN, supra note 30, at 39; cf. Eisen,
Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 53, at 10
(discussing the potential benefits of smart meter deployment).
217
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 44; BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., POLICIES FOR A
MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 50 (2013).
218
Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 53,
at 17–18 (discussing a case in which the Maryland PSC initially disallowed cost
recovery); MIT ENERGY INIT., supra note 3, at 140.
219
Smart meter deployment tripled between 2010 and 2012, primarily as a
result of the stimulus law of 2009 (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act),
which provided partial federal government funding for utilities to deploy them.
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FERC has described more technology barriers, including the
lack of standardization in the interface between the demand
response providers and the market, measurement and verification
challenges,220 and challenges of telemetry requirements that
demand response providers found difficult and expensive to
meet.221 Technologies with two-way communication capabilities
are important for demand response, to allow for near-real-time
verification of demand reductions. Yet there has been little
standardization in interoperability standards for smart meters until
recently.222 This “can create implicit barriers” to demand response
participation.223
The process of setting standards started after a provision of the
2007 Energy Independence and Security Act called for a
collaborative, federally coordinated standard-setting process, with
leadership from the National Institute of Standards and Technology
to produce standards adopted by FERC.224 Today, this effort has
transitioned to the private sector.225 FERC’s 2013 Order 676-G,
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009); FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 3. At present, 40% of U.S.
consumers have smart meters, but the extent of deployment varies widely by
state. FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 4.
220
Measuring the baseline from which to gauge demand reductions—how
much demand has the incentive reduced?—has been a challenging issue for
years. KATHAN, supra note 30, at 29–30; Bushnell et al., supra note 11, at 13.
221
Telemetry refers to near instantaneous metering and transfer of electricity
consumption data to system operators. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N,
ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING 81 (2012)
[hereinafter FERC DR-AM 2012]. For a discussion of telemetry requirements as
a barrier to demand response, see Order 719, supra note 176.
222
See generally Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid,
supra note 53. See also FERC DR-AM 2012, supra note 221, at 49 (describing a
“Lack of Uniform Standards” as an important issue).
223
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 9.
224
Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra note 53,
at 39–42 (discussing the inception and activities of the Smart Grid
Interoperability Panel (SGIP)). The statutory mandate to develop standards was
contained and described in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 1305 (2007); see FERC DR-AM 2010, supra note 64, at
15–16 (discussing the provision).
225
The SGIP is now a private sector organization. SGIP, http://www.sgip.org/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
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adopting measurement and verification standards of the North
American Energy Standards Board, is an example of a recent order
addressing the standards challenge.226 An important measurement
challenge is calculating exactly how much demand has been
reduced —which requires establishment of a baseline to compare
against actual meter readings. RTOs used differing methodologies
to come up with these numbers,227 and for years there has been no
standard method of calculating baselines.
Another type of barrier - economic barriers - includes two
subcategories. The first is “revenue availability”: is market
compensation sufficient to provide incentives for demand response
participation? The highest-profile example of this, of course, is the
situation Order 745 aimed to correct: the payment of less than the
full energy market price to a demand response provider. The
second type of economic barrier is “revenue capture,” or how
market payments are made, and whether they arrive with enough
certainty to support investment costs and provide an adequate
return on investment. In the energy market, for example, a CSP
receives the fluctuating energy market price. In the capacity
market, by contrast, the CSP typically receives a consistent
monthly payment in return for reducing demand during a small
number of hours each year, and some ancillary services markets
also offer a consistent payment. Not surprisingly, this predictability
of payment (together with the ability to bid into multiple markets)
has been a major factor in CSPs’ success.228
226

Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public
Utilities, Order No. 676-G, 156 FERC ¶ 61,055 (2013).
227
FERC DR-AM 2010, supra note 64, at 48; HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50,
at 60. RTOs are working toward more effective measurement and verification of
demand reductions. See, e.g., N.Y. Indep. Sys. Op., Inc., 155 FERC ¶ 61,243
(2016) (FERC approval of revisions to M&V protocols for demand response in
New York ISO); FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 22 (describing this
order).
228
HURLEY ET AL., supra note 50, at 64 describes the profitability scenario for
a CSP:
However, like any business, there are upfront capital costs. For demand
response aggregators, the costs of setting up the business, telemetry and
metering requirements, and ongoing interactions with so many
customers may be substantial. The business won’t work without a
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Finally, state regulators and legislatures have created barriers
to demand response providers’ participation in wholesale markets.
An example discussed more fully below is licensing and other
requirements specifying the conditions under which aggregators
can engage with customers.229 Beyond these obstacles, there are
procedural barriers (any reforms must be adopted through complex
RTO governance procedures230) and non-market barriers, including
an overall level of consumer resistance to efforts to cut back
electricity usage.
As FERC has noted, there is a lack of effective communication
about demand response231 and considerable challenges relating to
customer engagement.232 This topic is worth a full treatment in its
own right and beyond the scope of the discussion here. As a
general matter, as noted above, demand response is not something
consumers inherently want.233 Consumer characteristics such as
knowledge, awareness, and motivation often influence the success
of a demand response program.234 However, while education and
communication can help ameliorate this, they alone are insufficient
robust investment case. As such, the growth of demand response has
been strongest where a steady monthly payment is available, and where
multiple streams of revenue are present to support different types of
loads and different types of customers.
Id.

229

Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 7, at 84.
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 9. See E4 THE FUTURE, REGIONAL
ENERGY MARKETS: DO INCONSISTENT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IMPEDE U.S.
MARKET SUCCESS? (July 2016), https://e4thefuture.org/the-future-of-netmetering-utilities-and-solar-companies-align/
(describing
the
different
governance mechanisms employed by RTOs).
231
FERC DR-AM 2012, supra note 221, at 49 (discussing the complexities of
the RTOs’ various governance processes).
232
An effort to address these challenges is the Smart Grid Consumer
Collaborative. Smart Grid Consumer Collaborative, http://smartgridcc.org/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2017).
233
Constantine Gonatas, A Buyer’s Market, 149 No. 5 PUB. UTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY 8 (May 2011) (“[A] true barrier exists for residential, many
commercial and even large institutional customers: indifference and lack of
focus on energy conservation.”).
234
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY ADVISORY COMM., CONSUMER
ACCEPTANCE
OF
SMART
GRID
(June
2013),
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/06/f1/Weedall.pdf.
230
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because consumers are not universally receptive to information
about the benefits of demand response.235 External influences, such
as energy prices and the market availability of relevant
technologies, also affect a program’s success.
3.
The Federal Response: Statutory Encouragement and
Order 719
Both major omnibus energy policy acts of the 2000s contained
provisions designed to encourage demand response. Section
1252(f) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 states that it is the policy
of the United States to encourage “time-based pricing and other
forms of demand response, whereby electricity customers are
provided with electricity price signals and the ability to benefit by
responding to them . . . .”236 In recognition of the barriers to
demand response, it further provides that “deployment of such
technology and devices that enable electricity customers to
participate in such pricing and demand response systems shall be
facilitated, and unnecessary barriers to demand response
participation in energy, capacity and ancillary services markets
shall be eliminated.”237 The Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007 required the Commission to perform a national assessment
of demand response potential and develop a national action plan,238
and, as noted above, called for the development of technical
standards.239
In 2007, FERC held three technical conferences designed to
assess whether barriers to demand response prevented the
achievement of just and reasonable rates in the wholesale

235

Eisen, Who Regulates The Smart Grid, supra note 7, at 71; KATHAN, supra
note 30, at 39.
236
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(f) (2005).
237
Id.
238
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140,
§ 529 (2007). FERC issued this plan in 2010. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N
STAFF, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON DEMAND RESPONSE (2010),
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/demand-response/drpotential.asp.
239
Supra notes 221–223 and accompanying text.
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markets.240 The result was Order 719, promulgated in 2008, which
required RTOs to make four different reforms. As noted above,
participation in ancillary services markets was lagging.241 To
address and rectify this situation, Order 719 required RTOs to
accept bids from demand response resources in ancillary services
markets, on a basis comparable to other resources, as long as they
were technically capable of doing so.242 This would require
considerable adjustments to RTOs’ existing market rules. RTOs
were not required to establish new markets243 for this purpose, but
were required to make tariff changes to bring fast acting, flexible
demand response resources into existing energy imbalance,
reserves, and regulation markets.244
Order 719’s second reform required RTOs to “eliminate,
during a system emergency, certain charges to buyers in the energy
market for voluntarily reducing demand.”245 These specific charges
are known as “uplift” or “deviation charges,”246 and apply when a
buyer in the energy market takes less electric energy than it
scheduled ahead of time to take in the real-time market. This
causes costs, for example, “cost of extra generators committed
after the close of the day-ahead market to serve anticipated load, if
those costs are not recovered from sales of energy at real-time
LMPs.”247 The methods of determining and allocating these costs
penalized demand response resources that could respond during
emergencies. This is an example of the sort of fine-tuning iteration
required to accommodate demand response in a market that is not
designed to accommodate it.
240

Order 719, supra note 176, at 64,101 (highlighting FERC’s statement (as it
has in numerous other contexts involving improvements to the wholesale
electricity markets): “Improving the competitiveness of organized wholesale
markets is integral to the Commission fulfilling its statutory mandate to ensure
supplies of electric energy at just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential rates.”).
241
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 20.
242
Order 719, supra note 176, at 64,101.
243
Id. at 64,107.
244
Id.; CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
245
Order 719, supra note 176, at 64,103.
246
Id. at 64,112.
247
Id. at 64,112 n.133.
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Order 719’s third reform required RTOs to permit aggregators
to bid demand response on behalf of retail customers directly into
the organized markets, on the principle that allowing aggregation
of small retail loads into larger blocks of demand reductions would
reduce a barrier to demand response participation.248 At the time,
two RTOs did not allow aggregation,249 even though it was
successful elsewhere.250 The Order set forth ten criteria for an
aggregator to meet. Importantly, FERC addressed a “state veto”
issue. On the one hand, many commenters believed aggregators
should not be able to bid into wholesale markets without the
express permission of state regulators.251 They argued that blanket
permission by FERC would interfere with utility demand
management programs, place an undue burden on PUCs (for
example, if a PUC did not want aggregators to participate in the
state, it would have to take individual action to veto them252), and
raise new concerns about federal and state jurisdiction by
overriding states’ historical control over firms doing business
there. On the other hand, some commenters argued that giving
states a veto would hamper demand response participation in
wholesale markets.253 In the end, Order 719 provided, “The market
rules shall allow bids from an ARC unless this is not permitted
under the laws or regulations of [the] relevant electric retail
regulatory authority.”254

248

Id. at 64,119.
KLOTZ, supra note 165, at 1 (the two were the Midwest ISO and CAISO).
The Midwest ISO complied with this requirement in 2012. FERC DR-AM 2012,
supra note 221, at 39–40.
250
Order 719, supra note 176, at 64,116 (“[A]llowing ARCs to enter
wholesale energy markets has been successful in PJM, ISO New England, and
NYISO.”).
251
Id. at 64,116 (comments of utility company Ameren); id. at 64,116
(illustrating comments of National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
arguing “that if the Commission does not require explicit permission from the
relevant authority, ARCs would effectively be allowed to cherry-pick the best
load response resources out of existing LSE demand response programs”).
252
Id. at 64,117 (reflecting views of commenters on this issue).
253
Id. at 64,118 (highlighting comments of Wal-Mart).
254
Id. at 64,119.
249
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Order 719’s fourth reform required RTOs to modify their rules
governing price formation during periods of operating reserve
shortage to allow the market-clearing price during periods of
operating reserve shortage to more accurately reflect the true value
of energy.255 In particular, RTOs had adopted bid caps that did not
allow market prices to increase over those limits during periods of
shortage. This caused underestimation of demand response’s value
at those times when it was providing demand reductions.256
RTOs have submitted filings to comply with Order 719 since
2009,257 but the barriers identified still persist. FERC’s 2010 report
on demand response, for example, noted that commenters to it
“contended that the ISOs and RTOs continue to impose offer
parameter requirements that do not adequately recognize the
different characteristics of demand response and traditional
generation resources and, therefore, do not provide for comparable
treatment of demand response resources as required by Order No.
719.”258 Identification and changes to rules inhibiting demand
response bids in ancillary services markets continue to this day,
nearly a decade after Order 719.259
The relationship between states and demand response
aggregators continues to be complex. Some states still bar
aggregators, particularly in the Midwest ISO footprint.260 Others
have conditioned CSP activities on receiving prior approval from
the PUC, as in the case of Indiana, where state utility regulators
claimed this provision was necessary because “allowing retail
customers to aggregate demand response for sale through PJM
‘would at least partially bypass’ the IURC’s oversight of the retail

255

Id. at 64,101.
Id. at 64,124.
257
See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61,057 (2012)
(approving PJM’s filing to comply with Order 719’s price formation
requirement).
258
FERC DR-AM 2010, supra note 64, at 46.
259
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17.
260
Id. at 25 (citing states such as Wisconsin that have prohibited the operation
of aggregators).
256
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market.”261 Indiana’s restriction was challenged successfully in the
D.C. Circuit on procedural grounds.262
The Indiana decision highlights the tension in allowing
customers to enroll with CSPs, and, by extension, larger issues
relating to empowering third parties to compete with incumbent
utilities. By reducing demand through a firm not regulated as a
public utility, the customer uses less electricity, thereby purchasing
less of it from her utility and forcing the utility to rethink its rate
design. This “bypass” issue has been recognized since the
inception of wholesale market programs,263 as has a related issue:
the prospect of competition for customers between utilities and
CSPs for demand response customers.264 As it encourages
wholesale market programs, FERC is often cautioned against
jeopardizing utility demand management programs.265
C. Demand Response in the Wellinghoff Era (2009-2014)
For all the attention demand response received in the 2000s, it
was still “tough sledding”266 until Jon Wellinghoff became FERC’s
Chair in 2009. In Wellinghoff’s five years as FERC’s Chair, he
accelerated the agency’s focus on demand response and other
efforts to incorporate distributed energy resources into the bulk
power system.267 He personally championed demand response
261

Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 668
F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
262
Id.
263
KATHAN, supra note 30, at 52.
264
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 25.
265
An example of this is in Order 719, supra note 176, at 64,132, where the
American Public Power Association “cautions the Commission, as it seeks to
remove barriers to demand response resources, not to unintentionally endanger
existing and planned demand response and energy efficiency programs at the
retail level.”
266
Hannah Northey, Grid Evolves, and FERC Isn’t Just For Energy Wonks
Anymore, GREENWIRE (Mar. 18, 2014) (quoting lawyer Terry Black, former
head of the Sustainable FERC Project of the Natural Resources Defense
Council).
267
Id.; see also Eric Wesoff & Jon Wellinghoff, Departing FERC Chairman:
A Day in the Life of the Grid, GREENTECHMEDIA (May 30, 2013),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Jon-Wellinghoff-DepartingFERC-Chairman-A-Day-in-the-Life-of-the-Grid.

406

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 1

participation in the wholesale markets,268 and under his watch,
FERC issued two important Orders to further encourage
participation, including Order 745 (the controversy over which
landed in the Supreme Court) and Order 755.
1.
FERC Order 755 and Demand Response in Regulation
Markets
Before FERC’s Order 755, issued in 2011, the almost
instantaneous response needed for resources providing frequency
regulation was largely provided by power plants that could meet
RTOs’ requirements for acting so quickly.269 RTOs differ in their
frequency regulation products. Some offer only one product; others
compensate for the ability to increase output quickly (known as
“regulation-up”) or decrease it quickly (“regulation-down”).270
Some forms of demand response can act more quickly than
conventional power plants can start,271 and could therefore be less
expensive and more efficient in providing frequency regulation.272
However, RTOs’ compensation methods, generally speaking, had
not recognized this, adopting technical parameters that discouraged
demand response participation.
In response, FERC adopted a two-part compensation method
for all resources that provide regulation service. It required all
268

For example, in a law journal article, Wellinghoff and his co-author (who
later became FERC’s General Counsel) advocated for comparable treatment of
demand response and supply. Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18.
Wellinghoff practices what he preaches in his new capacity as the Chief Policy
Officer of solar company SolarCity. See Press Release, SolarCity Appoints Jon
Wellinghoff Chief Policy Officer, SOLARCITY (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://www.solarcity.com/newsroom/press/solarcity-appoints-jon-wellinghoffchief-policy-officer.
269
Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power
Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,260, 67,261 (Oct. 31, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt
35) [hereinafter FERC Order 755].
270
ZHI ZHOU ET AL., ARGONNE NAT’L LAB., SURVEY OF U.S. ANCILLARY
SERVICES MARKETS 1 (2016).
271
An aggregator can accomplish this by having some customers increase and
some decrease load, following the signal. CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 24.
272
Todd Griset, FERC Order 755 Promotes Energy Storage, PRETIFLAHERTY
(Dec. 21, 2011) http://energypolicyupdate.blogspot.com/2011/12/ferc-order755-promotes-energy-storage.html.
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ISO/RTOs to modify their tariffs to provide for a two-part payment
to frequency regulation resources and pay all resources that clear
the regulation market a uniform capacity payment and a
performance payment based on the accuracy of response to system
control signals.273 This latter requirement directly tied
compensation to the speed and accuracy of response. Therefore, it
promoted storage technologies such as batteries and flywheels,274
and forms of demand response that can provide a fast and flexible
resource capable of providing the frequency regulation service.275
RTOs have responded to Order 755 by changing market rules
to compensate resources that can respond to a fast signal.276 While
these markets are small,277 they are an increasingly important venue
for energy storage to participate in wholesale markets,278 as well as
demand response that can meet the applicable technical
273

FERC Order 755, supra note 269, at 67,283.
PJM Leads the US Fast-Frequency Regulation Market, ENERGY STORAGE
UPDATE (Apr. 20, 2015), http://analysis.energystorageupdate.com/marketoutlook/pjm-leads-us-fast-frequency-regulation-market.
275
CAPPERS ET AL., supra note 17, at 20–21. An example of an aggregator
firm’s multifaceted strategy to use demand response to meet this requirement is
described in Jeff St. John, Viridity, Enbala Try Negawatts to Balance
Pennsylvania’s
Grid,
GREENTECHMEDIA
(Nov.
23,
2011),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/viridity-enbala-try-negawatts-tobalance-pennsylvanias-grid.
276
Bolun Xu et al., A Comparison of Policies on the Participation of Storage
in U.S. Frequency Regulation Markets (Feb. 16, 2016) (unpublished paper) (on
file with Cornell University), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.04420.pdf (discussing
the regulation markets’ structures in each RTO).
277
To date, the PJM market accounts for the majority of demand response and
energy storage participation in regulation markets. PJM Leads the US FastFrequency Regulation Market, supra note 274; Katherine Tweed, Faster
Frequency Regulation Triples in PJM, GREENTECHMEDIA (Nov. 8, 2013),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/faster-frequency-regulationtriples-in-pjm. The total amount of demand response participating in the
regulation market averaged 16 MW in 2015. JAMES MCANANY, PJM
INTERCONNECTION, LLC, 2015 DEMAND RESPONSE OPERATIONS MARKETS
ACTIVITY REPORT 11 (2016), https://www.pjm.com/~/media/marketsops/dsr/2015-demand-response-activity-report.ashx. The largest market segment
was water heaters, making up 42% of confirmed registrations. Id.
278
See generally Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty:
Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697 (2014).
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requirements. And, as more distributed energy resources are added
to the grid, the need for flexible demand response resources to
provide frequency regulation will only increase.279
2.
FERC Order 745 and Demand Response in Energy
Markets
Order 745 focused on the wholesale energy markets. In 2011,
when it was issued after numerous rounds of comments and two
technical conferences, there was significantly more demand
response participation in capacity markets than in energy
markets.280 FERC believed one reason for this was the level of
compensation offered to demand response, which it set out to
correct. Order 745 concluded that demand response can provide
benefits similar to generation resources, and required wholesale
energy markets281 to pay the same market price for demand
response as for electricity generation. In addition, Order 745
included a requirement that RTOs establish a “net benefits test” to
provide payments to demand response only when energy prices
were above a specified threshold.282
Among the many objections to Order 745, two issues attracted
considerable attention: the propriety of the compensation level set
in Order 745, and FERC’s authority to issue the Order in the first
place.
a.
The Appropriate Compensation Level: LMP or “LMP –
G”?
In 2011, compensation levels for demand response in the
energy market varied significantly among RTOs. Some paid
demand response the full market price in the energy market,
known as the “locational marginal price” (“LMP”), but others did
not. At the time of Order 745, PJM paid demand response
279

Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 51, at 202–05.
Steve Isser & Bob King, The Price Is Right?, 153 No. 12 PUB. UTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY 14, 17 (2015).
281
Thus, Order 745 did not apply to emergency demand response markets, but
only to economic participation in energy markets. Order 745, supra note 7, at
16,659.
282
Id. at 16,666-67; Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 7, at
86 (describing the test requirement).
280
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providers the LMP, less the generation and transmission portions
of the retail rate.283 This formula came to be known as “LMP – G.”
FERC believed this was inadequate to prompt demand response
participation, claiming that if decreased demand had the same
effect on power markets as increased supply, and if supply was
paid the market price, then demand response should also be paid
the full LMP.
This position was extremely controversial. “[N]umerous
commenters” agreed with FERC that negawatts and megawatts
were comparable, in other words that, “an increment of generation
is comparable to a decrement of load for purposes of balancing
supply and demand in the day-ahead and real-time energy
markets.”284 Some even went further and argued that demand
response could sometimes be “superior” to generation.285 These
commenters focused on demand response’s benefits, and the belief
that incentive compensation could stimulate innovation in demand
response technologies and business models.286 Others strenuously
disagreed, arguing that demand response was not the equivalent of
generation,287 and that customers would respond to being paid to
curtail demand by moving generation “behind the meter,” negating
the benefits.288
283

Order 745, supra note 7, at 16,660.
Id. at 16,661.
285
Id.
286
Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note 7, at 100–01 (describing
other benefits for RTOs). Even opponents of Order 745 acknowledged this
“infant industry” argument. See, e.g., HOGAN, supra note 157, at 4.
287
HOGAN, supra note 157, at 2–3. Even after FERC v. EPSA upheld Order
745, Professor Hogan continued to stress that he believed “megawatts” and
“negawatts” were different. William Hogan, Demand Response: Getting The
Prices Right, 154 No. 3 PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 20 (Mar. 2016) (“Another
way to think about the ‘negawatt’ model is ‘reselling something I haven’t
purchased.’ As in: ‘I was thinking about subscribing to Public Utilities
Fortnightly, but I decided not to; please send me a check.’ This is quite different
from ‘I paid for my subscription but decided to cancel; please send me a
check.’”).
288
See, e.g., JAMES BUSHNELL ET AL., MKT. SURVEILLANCE COMM. OF THE
CAL. ISO, OPINION ON ECONOMIC ISSUES RAISED BY FERC ORDER 745:
DEMAND RESPONSE COMPENSATION IN ORGANIZED WHOLESALE ENERGY
MARKETS 2–3 (2011) http://www.caiso.com/2b97/2b97a0bb6ef70.pdf.
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Harvard Professor William Hogan (the originator of the LMP
concept), and groups including the Electric Power Supply
Association that represented power generators which stood to lose
market share as a result of Order 745,289 argued that those offering
demand response into wholesale markets already received a
benefit: the retail rate savings associated with the energy they did
not consume.290 As a result, paying full LMP was considered
“double-counting” and overcompensation to the demand response
provider,291 unless the retail rate for generation (G) was subtracted
out (that is, demand response was paid at LMP – G) to account for
the benefit associated with not consuming.292 FERC Commissioner
Moeller supported this view in his dissent to Order 745, arguing
that payments at full LMP were subsidies to demand response
providers that violated FERC’s statutory obligation to ensure just,
reasonable and non-discriminatory rates.
The “LMP – G” argument was criticized by those who claimed
that demand response providers were not “merely reselling
electricity in a purely financial transaction”293 and that pure market
efficiency was not the only consideration motivating Order 745. As
one analysis put it, “[t]he primary error made by the supporters of
what has come to be styled ‘LMP – G’ was to equate the
opportunity cost of the customer with the lost value of electricity
consumption, ignoring other costs and considerations.”294
b.

Jurisdictional Objections
The argument that FERC did not have the authority under the
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to promulgate Order 745 was over a
289

ROBERT KING ET AL., SOUTH-CENTRAL PARTNERSHIP FOR ENERGY
EFFICIENCY AS A RESOURCE, THE DEBATE ABOUT DEMAND RESPONSE AND
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 21 n.46 (2015).
290
See, e.g., William W. Hogan, Implications for Consumers of the NOPR’s
Proposal to Pay the LMP for All Demand Response 5 (May 2010) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://lmpmarketdesign.com/papers/Hogan_EPSA_NOPR_051210.pdf.
291
Order 745, supra note 7, at 16,663; KING ET AL., supra note 289, at 16–17.
292
Hogan, supra note 290; Pierce, supra note 7. See Eisen, Who Regulates
The Smart Grid?, supra note 7, at 73 n.18 (discussing this argument).
293
Isser & King, supra note 280, at 16.
294
KING ET AL., supra note 289, at 17.
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decade in the making. Fifteen years earlier, as wholesale market
programs were in their infancy and California was in crisis, several
industry trade associations claimed that these programs
impermissibly intrude on state PUCs’ regulatory turf. Under the
FPA, FERC regulates sales of electric energy at wholesale.295
Transactions in negawatts, the associations claimed, did not
involve sales, as “neither ‘energy’ nor ‘contract rights to a defined
[quota] of energy’ chang[e] hands.”296 If consumers were to cut
back on their electricity use, that decision was for state regulators
to make, not FERC.
That argument would recur in FERC v. EPSA, but it would
change shape somewhat in the interim. At one point before 2011,
FERC (and Chairman Wellinghoff, in a law review article)297
claimed that demand response involved a sale that it could
regulate. As there was no “energy” being sold, but instead a
promise to curtail using it, FERC eventually recognized that it
would be unsuccessful to pursue that argument, and did not rely on
it in Order 745.298
Now, opponents switched their focus, honing in on demand
response’s impacts on customers. In particular, they claimed that
any setting of rates for any transaction in which retail customers
take part is the exclusive province of the states. Several
commenters noted on the Order 745 proposal that it is “within the
purview of retail regulatory authorities to take into account local
policies and concerns, and the types of demand response being
offered, when determining the appropriate compensation level.”299
The California PUC sought clarification that FERC was not
attempting to regulate retail rates.300 This, of course, would later be

295
296

9.

297

Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1) (2012).
Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18, at 406; KATHAN, supra note 30, at

Wellinghoff & Morenoff, supra note 18.
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra
note 28, at 1796 n.61.
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300
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the basis of the D.C. Circuit’s holding that Order 745 directly
regulates the retail market.301
How was setting pricing levels in the wholesale market retail
rate regulation? Demand response presents a “thorny conundrum”
in that
[I]t looks like decisions by retail electricity customers to
use less power, in which case the states regulate it as part of
their historical jurisdiction over retail sales of electricity.
However, it is also a means for improving reliability of the
wholesale markets and achieving other benefits, in which
case FERC could regulate it.302
Order 745’s opponents pointed to the direct link between
wholesale market programs and retail rates. CSPs would not be
regulated as public utilities, and they could take actions in the
wholesale markets that would affect retail rates without the ability
for PUCs to control them. As the Illinois Commission stated:
[A]ny non-zero payment to a demand response resource
reduces the revenues to generators under the state
regulatory authority. The result is a leakage of money to an
entity outside of the state’s regulatory authority. Therefore,
retail rates to all customers may need to be increased in
order to recover the costs to generators that would have
otherwise been recovered through the purchase of
electricity, but instead went to the payment of a demand
response resource.303
PUCs would have other forms of recourse in this scenario. For
example, they could increase the rates demand response customers
paid for the electricity they consume, which would make wholesale
market programs less attractive by reducing the total
compensation.304 Other commenters pointed out that if the real
issue FERC was trying to address is the lack of dynamic pricing,
301

Infra notes 310–312 and accompanying text.
Joel Eisen, D.C. Circuit Vacates FERC Smart Grid “Demand Response”
Rule, LEGAL PLANET (May 30, 2014), http://legal-planet.org/2014/05/30/guestblogger-joel-eisen-d-c-circuit-vacates-ferc-smart-grid-demand-response-rule/.
303
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paying full LMP in wholesale markets would not accomplish
that.305 As noted above, dynamic pricing has been so slow in
coming that this objection rang a bit hollow.
To all of this, FERC had an argument at the ready: it was
setting compensation levels in wholesale markets, not engaging in
retail rate setting, and it would not refrain from issuing Order 745
because it might impact the states.306 There is an obvious
intersection between actions FERC takes in the wholesale markets
and actions taken by the states, as the states had just articulated.307
But FERC was acting in the domain it controls, with its charge
under the FPA to ensure that rates charged for energy in wholesale
energy markets are “just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential.”308 Citing to Order 719, FERC stated
that it was only deciding what happened in the wholesale markets,
and that it had authority over demand response’s compensation
level “because it directly affects wholesale rates.”309 Some,
prefiguring this eventual holding of FERC v. EPSA, agreed that
“the FPA gives the Commission broad authority to correct market
flaws, including compensation for demand response.”310
3.

The Impact of Order 745 and the D.C. Circuit Opinion
Immediately after Order 745, demand response participation
rates in wholesale energy markets increased. In PJM, for example,
participation rates were much higher in 2014 than in 2011,311

305

Id.
Id. at 16,676.
307
Supra note 9 and accompanying text (articles discussing this intersection
and its ramifications for electricity federalism).
308
Order 745, supra note 7, at 16,676.
309
Id.
310
Id. at 16,677. Others claimed FERC could not set the wholesale
compensation level at LMP – G because that would be retail rate setting. Id. at
16,675.
311
PJM INTERCONNECTION LLC, 2012 ECONOMIC DEMAND RESPONSE
PERFORMANCE REPORT: ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC DR PARTICIPATION IN THE
PJM WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKET AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ORDER 745
7 Fig. 1 (2013), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/dsr/20150701-order745-impact-on-economic-dr.ashx.
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although they still lagged in capacity market participation
considerably.312
EPSA and four other electricity industry associations promptly
filed a petition against Order 745 in the D.C. Circuit. The resulting
opinion of a divided three-judge panel in May 2014313 left no doubt
from the outset where it stood. It vacated Order 745 in its entirety,
agreeing with the petitioners that demand response is a retail
market phenomenon, beyond the scope of FERC’s authority
because it was “encroaching on the states’ exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the retail market.”314 The majority opinion stated that,
“Demand response—simply put—is part of the retail market. It
involves retail customers, their decision whether to purchase at
retail, and the levels of retail electricity consumption.”315 FERC
had authority to regulate practices affecting the wholesale market,
provided it was not “directly regulating a matter subject to state
control, such as the retail market.”316 Because FERC had done just
that, it could not proceed with Order 745.
Ignoring over a century of doctrine construing the principle
limiting agency jurisdiction over “practices affecting rates” to
those practices directly and significantly doing so,317 the majority
opinion further rejected FERC’s claim of authority as having no
boundaries. If it thought it would impact the wholesale markets,
FERC might even reach out and regulate the “steel, fuel, and labor
markets.”318 That there were well known checks on FERC’s
authority that would preclude it from doing this went completely
unnoticed in the majority opinion, which barreled forth to its
312

PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, 2014 DEMAND RESPONSE OPERATIONS
MARKETS ACTIVITY REPORT 13 (2015), https://www.pjm.com/~/media/marketsops/dsr/2014-demand-response-activity-report.ashx.
313
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d
and remanded, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
314
Id. at 218.
315
Id. at 223.
316
Id. at 222.
317
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra
note 28, at 148–51 (discussing the origins and development of this doctrine,
including its articulation in Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d
395 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
318
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 221.
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conclusion that wholesale energy market demand response
programs overstepped FERC’s authority. For good measure, the
majority found that even if it were to assume that FERC had
jurisdiction over demand response, it would overturn Order 745’s
setting of the compensation level at full LMP as arbitrary and
capricious.319
Judge Edwards, in his dissent, observed that, “The task for this
court, of course, is not to divine from first principles whether a
demand response resource subject to Order 745 is best considered
a matter of wholesale or retail electricity regulation. Rather, our
task is one of statutory interpretation within the
familiar Chevron framework.”320 Applying Chevron, he found that,
“FERC’s explanation of its jurisdiction under the Federal Power
Act is straightforward and sensible.”321
D. The Aftermath, and then the Supreme Court Speaks
The D.C. Circuit opinion endangered demand response
participation in all wholesale markets. If FERC had no jurisdiction
over demand response in the energy markets, it presumably had no
authority to allow it in capacity or ancillary services markets,
either.322 Indeed, following that logic, the utility FirstEnergy filed a
complaint with FERC immediately after the D.C. Circuit’s
decision, stating that demand response should be excluded from all
wholesale markets.323 That would have harmed CSPs far more,324
319

Id. at 224–25.
Id. at 226–27.
321
Id. at 232.
322
Peter Cappers & Andy Satchwell, Considerations for State Regulators and
Policymakers in a Post-FERC Order 745 World, ELECTRICITYPOLICY.COM
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UTIL.
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(Oct.
21,
2014),
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324
The D.C. Circuit’s decision “threatened to disable [demand response], with
serious implications for consumers as well as DR suppliers.” Anne Hoskins &
Paul Roberti, The Essential Role of State Engagement in Demand Response, 40
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 14, 16 (2016).
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because (as noted above) the vast majority of demand response
participation at the time was in the capacity markets. One need
look no further than PJM, which, attempting to respond to the
uncertainty over FERC’s authority, made controversial changes to
its compensation model in the capacity market for demand
response after the D.C. Circuit decision.325 One year later, it
observed a ten percent drop in demand response participation.326
A number of states,327 environmental groups,328 and scholars329
disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s central contention that FERC
lacked the authority under the FPA to issue Order 745. The
Supreme Court concurred, in Justice Elena Kagan’s opinion for a
six-Justice majority that upheld Order 745’s central requirement of
paying full LMP to demand response in the wholesale energy
markets.330 The Court stated that regulating demand response fell
comfortably within FERC’s authority over “practices” affecting
wholesale rates if rates are “directly” affected.331 It rejected the
D.C. Circuit’s argument that demand response was to be left to the
states, concluding that it directly impacted wholesale rates because
bidding demand reductions into wholesale markets changes
wholesale prices.332 As the Court stated, “[w]holesale demand
325

PJM INTERCONNECTION LLC, THE EVOLUTION OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN
PJM
WHOLESALE
MARKET
(2014),
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326
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REPORT, supra note 153, at 255.
327
Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania and several other states supported FERC,
as did various state administrative agencies. Joint States’ Reply Brief On the
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FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840).
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response is all about reducing wholesale rates; so too the rules and
practices that determine how those programs operate.”333 The Court
concluded, “[i]t is hard to think of a practice” that has a more
direct impact on wholesale rates,334 as distinguished from activities
that have “indirect or tangential impacts” on wholesale markets.
With this distinction, the D.C. Circuit’s “parade of horribles”
argument, that FERC could regulate the steel or labor markets if it
so chose if Order 745 stood, was correctly swept away into
history.335
Notably, the Court rejected the contentions about trampling on
state regulatory authority that had prevailed in the D.C. Circuit.
Order 745 was not invalid just because it impacted PUCs’ rate
setting functions; that did not foreclose FERC from acting.336
Finally, the Court upheld Order 745’s compensation approach,
finding that FERC “engaged in reasoned decisionmaking,” and
“selected a compensation formula with adequate support in the
record, and intelligibly explained the reasons for making that
choice.”337
The long-term ramifications of FERC v. EPSA for developing
markets for demand response are discussed more fully below. In
the short term, it was an obvious boost to demand response, and
forestalled the attacks on the other regulatory efforts FERC had
taken to promote it. As one observer noted, “FERC orders in recent
years ha[ve] resulted in the opening of additional electricity
markets to [demand response]; and it was these newly opened
markets for services such as capacity, frequency regulation and
response, reactive power, and other so-called ‘ancillary services’
that were ultimately at risk.”338 Moreover, the ratification of
FERC’s broad authority under the “practices affecting rates”
333
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335
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336
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Todd Olinsky-Paul, Supreme Court Upholds FERC Action on Demand
Response,
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ENERGY
WORLD
(Jan.
27,
2016),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ugc/articles/2016/01/supreme-courtupholds-ferc-action-on-demand-response.html.
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language empowered FERC to consider even more ambitious
policy and market development efforts, such as efforts currently
underway to consider carbon pricing in the wholesale markets.339
The validation of Order 745’s compensation approach was a
watershed moment for demand-side participation in the electric
grid. The objections to demand response being a thing at all, and
the struggle for treatment on par with supply, evaporated. Finally,
after decades of doubt, demand response was valued as a system
resource, and explicitly put on the same footing as supply in the
grid.
IV.

DEMAND RESPONSE 3.0: NEW MARKETS . . . AND NEW
CHALLENGES
Even after the green light from FERC v. EPSA, however, much
of demand response’s potential is still untapped, or “ignored.”340
Yet with the Supreme Court’s upholding of FERC’s rules, and
increasingly promising technologies and development of standards,
it does seem that attention to it is popping up everywhere. Two
exciting developments at the heart of this third generation of
demand response are increasingly automated technologies that
allow for more flexible demand response resources, and the
contemplation of new opportunities for putting a value on the
ability for resources behind the meter to provide that flexibility to
the electric grid.
One important avenue for demand response to be valued more
highly is being developed at the distribution level of the electricity
system. This part of the system is undergoing rapid change, with
much of it seemingly aimed at being more disaggregated and
339

Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra
note 28, at 1786; see NEW ENGLAND POWER POOL, INTEGRATING MARKETS AND
PUBLIC POLICY, http://nepool.com/IMAPP.php (illustrating the ongoing effort
by stakeholders to develop a carbon price for the ISO-New England RTO).
340
Krysti Shallenberger, Predictions 2017: What the New Year Will Bring for
Demand-Side
Management,
UTIL.
DIVE
(Jan.
4,
2017),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/predictions-2017-what-the-new-year-willbring-for-demand-side-management/433332/ (quoting James McPhail, CEO,
Zen Ecosystems, “Most of the market that could benefit from demand response
programs and energy management systems has been ignored.”).
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reliant on distributed energy resources. Several states are radically
reforming their state regulatory processes to accelerate DER
integration into the grid and accomplish other goals such as
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. These states contemplate a
future in which the regulated utility (and a variety of third parties
with which it interacts, through regulatory structures designed for
the purpose) enables customer choice through advanced
distribution system planning and networking. Eventually, some,
such as New York, contemplate adopting new market structures
such as trading platforms that would provide greatly enhanced
opportunities for DER to provide grid services.
This Part begins with a discussion of the changing technical
nature of demand response, and its role in the rapidly evolving
ideas about transforming the electricity distribution system to add
new market opportunities, describing proceedings and specific
projects that are at the vanguard of change. While these new
opportunities are extremely promising, the prospect of their
success must be evaluated against the principles and lessons
learned from the fifty-year history of demand-side participation in
the electric grid, as discussed in the second section of this Part.
A. Flexible Technologies and New Market Opportunities
The very nature of demand response is shifting before our eyes.
Technically, the early forms of demand response were onedimensional sources of flexibility (demand reductions controlled
by a utility with limited customer involvement), and typically
limited in when and how often they were required to provide
demand reductions. A demand response resource receiving a
capacity payment, for example, might only be called a few times
each year. Now, technologies such as energy storage batteries,
grid-connected electric vehicles,341 and remotely controlled water

341

Mark Detsky & Gabriella Stockmayer, Electric Vehicles: Rolling over
Barriers and Merging with Regulation, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 477, 480–81 (2016) (discussing policy needs for EV grid integration).

420

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 1

and space heaters342 offer the potential to reduce demand more
frequently, perhaps in real time.
The smart, Internet-connected grid appears to be fast
approaching.343 With the rise of advanced control hardware and
software and other technologies, and standards for the exchange of
information, demand response can be more increasingly thought of
as an automatically responsive grid resource. Residential demand
response, which remains modest in participation compared to
reductions from commercial and industrial customers, is “poised
for expansion if regulators put in place the right policies to help it
grow.”344 For example, “bring your own thermostat” programs
being tested now345 can allow consumers to program settings from
a smartphone or tablet and automatically offer their demand
reductions to utilities and markets. The value of this sort of
demand response is in its fast-acting nature and its ability to
decrease or increase demand flexibly on a much more frequent
basis, perhaps as often as every day.346

342

Thirty five states now have water heater load control programs. FERC DRAM 2016, supra note 22, at 23. See also supra note 277 and accompanying text
(discussing grid-connected water heaters as a resource in the PJM regulation
market).
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MIT ENERGY INIT., supra note 3, at 36 (noting that, “Though only now
beginning, these changes could become commonplace in ten years and could
lead to a power system that Thomas Edison would not have recognized.”).
344
Robert Walton, The Value of Less: Quantifying the Benefit of Peak
Demand
Savings,
UTIL.
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(Nov.
4,
2015),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-value-of-less-quantifying-the-benefit-ofpeak-demand-savings/408565/.
345
NAVIGANT RESEARCH, BRING YOUR OWN THERMOSTAT DEMAND
RESPONSE (2016), https://www.navigantresearch.com/research/bring-your-ownthermostat-demand-response (describing pilot BYOT programs).
346
Michael Kanellos, Demand Response? Try Demand Management,
GREENTECHMEDIA
(June
9,
2010),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/demand-response-try-demandmanagement (“Instead of curbing power three to ten hours a year, demand
management companies could take control of air conditioners and other devices
for 50 hours a year or more with smaller dips in power curtailment over a far
wider base . . . .”). See also Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 51,
at 205–08 (describing this “virtual power plant” concept and a pilot project by
the San Antonio utility CPS Energy).
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This evolution to having much more automated and
customizable programs and expanded potential market segments is
exciting. To date, however, compared to existing emergency and
economic demand response programs, these programs are in their
infancy, or as FERC describes it, “in the minority and generally
lacking.”347 On the other hand, “[t]his dynamic is starting to change
and additional market opportunities are beginning to be created for
demand response to provide additional value.”348 States, in
particular, have begun ambitious efforts to put in place policies and
goals that will help grow the market for demand response.
Notably, a handful of PUCs have embarked on comprehensive
grid modernization proceedings, taking a view of the grid that calls
for a broader portfolio of resources to meet the demands of the
future, and a corresponding resilience in the system. These efforts
recognize that the grid as a whole is changing rapidly. Over the
past several years, renewable energy resources have made up a
significant portion of new capacity additions.349 Distributed energy
resources—including solar PV, electric vehicles and energy
storage—are connecting to the grid in ever-growing numbers.
Accommodating these developments has prompted the states to
take action,350 and may tip the scale in favor of more
experimentation with markets for distributed energy resources,
including demand response. In today’s parlance, there might be
more value streams for monetizing demand response, as it may be
more useful to the grid in balancing increases in distributed energy

347

FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 33; Schare & Feldman, supra note

13.
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FERC DR-AM 2016, supra note 22, at 33.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SOLAR, NATURAL GAS, WIND MAKE UP MOST
2016
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ADDITIONS
(Mar.
1,
2016),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=25172 (including chart that
shows that solar and wind make up more that 2/3 of scheduled capacity
additions for 2016, and that, “2016 will be the first year in which utility-scale
solar additions exceed additions from any other single energy source”).
350
See generally William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism:
Rate Design and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810
(2016) (discussing numerous state policy experiments).
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resources,351 or providing other services to local distribution
systems.
States including California, Illinois, Maryland, New York,
Massachusetts, and Hawaii have begun proceedings aimed at
reconsidering the roles and responsibilities of utilities. In New
York, for example, the Public Service Commission began the
Reforming the Energy Vision process in 2014, aimed at eventually
refashioning the state’s utilities as market platform providers for
distributed energy resources.352 In these states, there is emerging
consideration of how markets may be organized to better
coordinate generation (both conventional and distributed sources)
and demand response in the distribution system, where organized
markets do not yet exist. These markets, for example, would
enable consumers to offer demand response to help coordinate the
influx of large numbers of disparate types of resources on the grid.
These emerging state policies suggest a more integrated role
for demand response in planning and management of the
distribution system.353 Distribution level markets would address
different systems than the wholesale markets, and compensate for
different services provided. An example of such a service would be
the use of solar PV with smart inverters to supply voltage and
reactive power regulation services on a distribution feeder line,
which some believe it can do more quickly than traditional sources
of power correction on distribution lines.354 Reducing demand at
times of system stress can also help “avoid expensive distribution
infrastructure upgrades otherwise needed to meet those peaks.”355
Thinking about the structure of markets to create business
opportunities at the distribution level for demand response to
351

See MIT ENERGY INIT., supra note 3, at 265–306 (including chapter on
“Understanding the Value of Distributed Energy Resources”).
352
See Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, supra note 9, at 13–16
(discussing the REV proceeding).
353
See Schare & Feldman, supra note 13.
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(Jan.
30,
2012),
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N.Y. Pub. Svc. Comm’n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 158 FERC ¶ 61,137
(Feb. 3, 2017).
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provide services such as these remains very new, and it has not yet
been determined how such markets will operate.
A pioneering use of market techniques involving demand
response is the “Brooklyn-Queens Neighborhood Program” of the
New York utility Consolidated Edison (ConEd).356 In this program,
ConEd is relying on demand response and other “non-wires”
alternatives to building new infrastructure in Brooklyn and Queens
in New York City.357 In August 2016, ConEd held a demand
response auction as part of this program, with ten offers accepted
totaling 22 MW of demand response by 2018.358 Adding demand
response to its system in this fashion allows ConEd to defer over
$1 billion in substation construction and other investments.
More will be needed to capitalize on distribution level demand
response market opportunities. Regulatory frameworks should
create opportunities, define services to be provided in such a way
that demand response can participate, and establish institutional
structures that put demand response on a level playing field with
generation. This will require the involvement of distribution
utilities, which have been active players in the state grid
modernization proceedings. New York has chosen the distribution
utilities to operate the distribution system and serve as platform
providers. This will require focused attention in the development
of market structures to ensure that demand response is adequately
compensated.
Besides this, there will be an increasing need for coordination
and integration of these new distribution level market opportunities
with the existing wholesale markets. The two will intersect in
significant ways,359 as the New York ISO recently described in a
356
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https://www.coned.com/en/save-money/rebates-incentives-tax-credits/theneighborhood-program (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
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http://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-non-wire-alternative-coneds-brooklynqueens-pilot-rejects-traditional/423525/.
358
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This is not precluded by the FPA. See generally Eisen, Dual Electricity
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“roadmap” document describing means for integrating new
distribution level markets with its wholesale markets.360 An
important issue, among others, that may recur frequently during
this coordination process is that demand response could
simultaneously provide a distribution level service (e.g., feeder
relief, say) and a wholesale level service (e.g., frequency
regulation in an ancillary services market).361 It will be important to
ensure that these opportunities are aligned, through proper design
of distribution market rules and alignment with existing wholesale
market rules, to avoid hampering demand response participation.362
These, and a myriad of other challenges, await the states as
they move forward. Although some challenges are new, others are
not. Demand response has been a crucible for testing important
principles about the grid’s future, and that tells us much about the
likelihood of success of the ongoing grid modernization efforts.
Numerous economic, technical, and regulatory issues have been
addressed extensively in an iterative process spanning decades, and
it is worthwhile to pause and consider just what has been
accomplished.
B. Lessons Learned Over the Past Fifty Years
In light of these new opportunities for demand response, we
return to the question originally posed above: when you sign up for
Rush Hour Rewards, or a CSP bids your demand reductions into a
wholesale market, how does that help change our one-way grid?
of a new era of electricity federalism in which federal and state regulators can
address an activity concurrently). Cf. Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism,
67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1627 (2016) (noting that scholars are beginning to discuss
an energy federalism model “that would treat federal and state jurisdiction not as
independent or mere substitutes but, instead, as interdependent and
complementary”).
360
See generally N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY
RESOURCES ROADMAP FOR NEW YORK’S WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS
(Jan.
2017),
http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/market_data/demand
_response/Distributed_Energy_Resources/Distributed_Energy_Resources_Road
map.pdf.
361
Id. at 25.
362
Id.
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Consider this (hardly unique) statement: demand response can
“help transform our electricity system from a one-way, centralized
power network where customers passively receive electricity to a
two-way flow of information where people regularly contribute to
system operations.”363 That word “help” is doing an awful lot of
work here, and the full extent of just how much is hardly obvious364
unless one is aware of the decades-long evolution of demand
response.
Think back to Rush Hour Rewards, or aggregations of retail
customers into a block of demand reductions for sale into a
spinning reserve market. In the humble act of choosing to cut back
your consumption and getting paid for it, you are selling something
to the utility or market: the reduction in your electricity demand. If
it seems that you are simply refraining from consumption and not
“selling” anything that argument was made for years and then
FERC v. EPSA soundly rejected it, full stop. You are selling
negawatts. There have been significant and strenuous arguments
about their value, as we have seen. However, they must have some
value; otherwise, SCE or a CSP wouldn’t pay you for them.
You are selling the utility something it wants, getting paid for
your forbearance, and yet still are buying power from it. This is
profound. Demand response fundamentally changes the way you
interact with a utility:365 a customer (you) can be both a buyer (of
power) and a seller (of demand reductions). You, in today’s

363

PANFIL & FINE, supra note 129, at 7.
It would be a sage indeed who could divine from “demand response” any
notion that it plays a central role in the grid’s future. Panfil, supra note 14 (“The
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concept it represents.”).
365
See, e.g., Larry Plumb, GreenGov Dialogue on Demand Response: the
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popular term, are a “prosumer” as well as a consumer.366 In a
transaction with a CSP to aggregate your demand reductions into a
biddable block, there is already a two-way exchange of resources.
More demand response means more of these transactions.
Perhaps eventually, with the advent of the state level grid
modernization proceedings and further efforts in the wholesale
markets by FERC, we could have a full two-way grid. Researchers
and scholars are studying and piloting the building blocks of a
“transactive energy” system: a true two-way grid with markets for
electricity products and services, and decentralized control of the
grid relying on distributed resources to provide the requisite
flexibility.367 What would be exchanged on it and how its structure
would look would be very different from trading in demand
response negawatts. Advanced technologies allow for
contemplation of a multidirectional grid, where prosumers can sell
more services back to the grid than demand reductions from their
buildings, solar systems, or vehicle fleets. One example that has
been studied for years is “vehicle-to-grid” (V2G): using an electric
vehicle’s battery as a storage device and enabling the owner to sell
some of its charge back to a utility or CSP when the grid needs that
small amount of power.368 Even though there are more electric
vehicles and associated infrastructure is developing,369 V2G is still
366

See Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power __
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CLEAN
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(Aug.
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a long way off. There are many more needs for a full two-way
grid, such as a legal framework that would promote the trading of
resources.
The concept of a two-way exchange of resources, however, is
on its way to full validation as a result of the evolution of demand
response policies. In addition, the promotion of demand response
done by third parties has enshrined the concept of competition to
utilities and generators in wholesale markets,370 even though those
markets were established for a completely different purpose. This
supports an idea that is critical to the grid’s future. Consumers can
trade in wholesale electricity markets through registered
intermediaries, which are not utilities and have different business
models and economic incentives.
Thus, FERC v. EPSA validated business model competition in
the electric grid, even if the precise legal issue was not framed that
way, and even if full third party participation is hardly universal
today. Notably, this progress came in the face of vigorous
opposition from incumbent participants in the system that argued
against it. Sellers and the intellectual titans responsible for
designing those markets argued against letting demand response in,
because they believed it was not power and, thus, could not be
treated the same way. They lost that argument. By acknowledging
CSPs, and approving an incentive meant in part to help them, the
Court has encouraged more market competition by companies that
do not generate electricity. This may be one of FERC v. EPSA’s
most important accomplishments.371
With the green light given to experimenters, it is exciting to
speculate about the possibilities. Consider how momentous that
may turn out to be. Still, as the history of demand response
suggests, things tend to move slowly in this industry. This is not
smartphones with immediate “disruption” potential.372 Advanced
370

Panfil, supra note 14 (“Instead of allowing utilities to operate as natural
monopolies with little competition to speak of, the new market will enable
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371
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technologies can be an important element of change, and, indeed at
times, are an obvious prerequisite to change, as in the case of smart
meters. But as we have seen in the fifteen-year history of demand
response in the organized electricity markets, technology alone
does not drive immediate institutional change. Answers will take
much longer than the time scale of recent innovations in
technology. The basic questions have been asked for decades, but
institutional change has not followed as swiftly.
As the discussion above demonstrates, throughout its history
demand response has found it difficult to achieve a level playing
field in markets designed to trade power. It is “something
different–not quite efficiency, not quite supply,” but treated as “a
load-modifying resource that is sometimes paid as though it were a
supply resource.”373 Because demand response is not power,
market rules have had to be created or aligned over time to make it
viable. FERC’s support in rules such as Orders 719, 745, and 755
has been essential to enable greater participation of demand
response. And most recently, it issued a proposed rule to promote
storage in the organized wholesale markets and suggest that RTOs
look to California’s DER aggregation proposal to knock down
more barriers preventing distributed resource participation in
wholesale markets.374
There is no reason to believe that this active policy support will
be any less essential in the states’ grid modernization proceedings.
Indeed, given that the results might include complete
transformations of the role of distribution utilities, it is even more
373

DAN DELUREY, THE WEDGEMERE GRP., DEMAND RESPONSE: THE ROAD
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374
Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg.
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markets). See Eisen & Mormann, supra note 366 (proposing a new trading
paradigm for electricity with this FERC rule (assuming it becomes a final rule)
as a building block).
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unlikely that demand response would find acceptance without
policy support.375 Mandates and market rule reforms by the states
will be a central component of expanding demand response’s
reach. And some more lessons from the history of encouraging
demand response participation in the organized wholesale markets
will be significant here as well. There will be geographic
differences in how fast conditions change. Throughout demand
response’s history, market experiments have not been uniform
across the nation and have been more successful in certain
individual regions and markets than others. That variability is
likely to continue for some time. Policies are iterative in their
nature; note that FERC’s Orders acted to address problems in each
of the three different categories of markets as specific barriers were
identified and addressed. Again, we would expect that sort of
policy development activity at the state level.
Finally, prompting recalcitrant actors to accept demand-side
participation and conceptualizing demand response’s role at times
of momentous industry transformations has always required the
presence of visionary regulators who have combated the forces
tending to inertia. As the need for policy innovation presents itself
now in a different setting, those familiar with the history of
demand response will articulate more forcefully for its inclusion in
the grid of the future. Change in this industry is always difficult,
and, as FERC v. EPSA suggests, powerful interests still remain
aligned against the full incorporation of demand response
resources. Distribution utilities are entrenched monopolies that are
unlikely to face their demise anytime soon.376 With the assistance
of groups representing power generators, they can (and do) portray
demand response as inefficient or unwanted.377 And consumers still
375
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Panfil, supra note 14 (“Now it’s not yet time to signal that FERC v. EPSA
means utilities are about to fall down the rabbit hole of the vaunted death spiral.
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have not overwhelmingly pushed for more of it. Thus, as exciting
as it is to think of the networked future for the grid—and even the
potential for legal frameworks that could leap well beyond what
the states are doing today378—one should get comfortable in
thinking of years, rather than months, and settle in for the long
haul.
CONCLUSION
“What’s past is prologue,” Shakespeare wrote.379 So it is here,
as the lessons of five decades of promoting demand-side
participation in the grid inform the future. Even as transformative
change is everywhere in the electric grid, optimism and enthusiasm
for how fast things will change must be tempered by the realities of
the grid. The enormous potential of demand response has been
recognized for decades, but we still have nowhere near as much of
it as we could, and technology alone will not guarantee industry
disruption. The technological change since the 1970s is impressive,
but it has always outstripped institutional change, and change in
this industry takes time. Progress will not be linear. There will be
advances and setbacks.
Demand response is not a new invention. Its basic concepts
have been understood for decades. And as for the connectedness
that everyone believes is on the horizon, we have been talking
about “smart homes” since the 1980s.380 Yet there have been
important changes since then for demand response, which has
demonstrated that it can serve as a reliable and economic resource
for wholesale markets and has finally been recognized as a system
resource on par with generation.
This Article has described the “market pathways” that brought
us to the present day, and that (combined with other technology
and regulatory innovations) might lead to a radically different
public interest. Market newcomers face an uphill battle for getting their issues
attended to by legislatures and regulators alike. As long as utilities fight against
DER reforms, it will be difficult.”).
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electric grid in the years to come. And so, instead of being ignored,
compared to building new power plants, demand response has
become something else entirely: a vanguard of this new electric
grid, a spark for entrepreneurs and pilot projects, and a test bed of
important regulatory principles like frameworks for interactivity
with the grid, the role of third parties and new business models,
and the split of regulatory jurisdiction between states and FERC.
Decades from now, “demand response” won’t exist in its
current forms. No one today uses a “Hush-a-Phone,” the
rudimentary voice silencing device for telephones of the 1920s
through 1950s.381 But everyone takes it as a given that they can use
phone lines for private benefit without the phone company’s
consent, a principle decided in the seminal case involving that
widget. So even if we don’t have demand response in the longterm, we may well remember that FERC’s Orders, FERC v. EPSA,
state policies, and other initiatives made a very different electric
grid possible.

381

Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); see Joel B.
Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innovation on
the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712 (2014) (analogizing this case to
pioneering legal precedents involving demand response and the Smart Grid).

